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THE TAX TREATMENT OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES
Chapter 1 - Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the tax consequences 
attaching to the payment of compensation or damages in South 
African Tax Law. Payments of compensation and damages are 
made in numerous divergent instances but more commonly in 
cases where assets are expropriated or destroyed or profits 
are lost and insure nee proceeds become payable, where 
contracts are cancelled or simply as a result of faulty or 
deficient performance under a contract.
The payment of compensation or damages gives rise to two 
major queries, namely is the payment on the one hand a 
deductible expense in the hands of the payee and is the 
receipt of the payment a taxable receipt in the hands of the 
recipient? The answer to these two queries depends to a 
large extent on an analysis of the general principles 
applicable to the deduction of expenditure and the tax­
ability of income. In other words, is a payment of com­
pensation or damages an expenditure or loss incurred in the 
production of income and laid out wholly and exclusively for 
the purposes of trade; and, is the receipt of compensation 
income or capital? Xt is proposed to deal with these topics 
with reference to the provisions of the Income Tax Act No,
58 of 1962, as amended, ("the Act") and the decided South 
African cases on the topic, although extensive reference 
will also be made to English and Australian cases dealing 
with the topic. It is also proposed to attempt to analyse* 
whether the nature of the particular payment in question, 
ie. a lump sum or on-going payment, in any way affects the 
issue.
A related issue to the two main questions stated above is 
whether or not when claiming damages, it is appropriate to 
take into account the possible incidence of tax in deter-^ - 
mining the amount of the damages payable* This question 
will also be discussed with reference to decided South 
African and English cases.
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Chapter 2 - The taxability or otherwise of a payment in 
respect of compensation or damages
It is proposed to deal irt this section with the question 
whether the receipt or accrual of a payment being in respect 
of compensation or damages, is taxable in the hands of the 
recipient,
"Gross income" is defined in Section 1 of the Act as 
follows:
"Gross Income, in relation to any year or period of 
assessment, means, in the case of any person, the total 
amount, in cash or otherwise, receivei by or accrued to 
or in favour of such person during such year or period 
of assessment from a source within or deemed to be 
within the Republic, excluding receipts or accruals of 
a capital nature, .
The definition then goes on to list certain specific types 
of payment which are expressly included in the?, definition. 
For purposes of the present enquiry, the crux of the problem 
relates to whether the receipt or accrual of a payment in 
respect of damages or compensation is income or capital.
The Act does not define what is meant by receipts or 
accruals of "a capital nature'* and accordingly it is
necessary to have recourse to the decided cases in this 
respect. As Lord Hanworth, M.R. said in the case of 
Van Den Berqhsf Limited v Clark (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) 
(19TC 39 0) in the Court of Appeals at page 4,15 of the 
report:
"This case raises once more the troublesome question - 
and it is really always a troublesome question - as to 
whether a payment or a receipt, according to the 
particular circumstances, is to be treated as paid or 
received on account of capital,*'
Maritz J. in C.l.R. v Visser (8 SATC 2 71) stated at 27 6;
"If we take the economic meaning of "capital" and 
''income", the one excludes the other. "Income" is what 
"capital" produces, or is something in the nature of 
interest or fruit as opposed to principal or tree.
This economic distinction is a useful guide in matters 
of Income Tax, but its application is very often a 
matter of great difficulty, for what is principal or 
tree in the hands of one man may be interest or fruit 
in the hands of another. Law books in the hands of a 
lawyer are a capital asset; in the hands of a book­
seller they are a trade asset. A farm owned by a 
farmer is a capital asset? in the hands of a land 
jobber it becomes stock-in-trade,"
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Despite the difficulty which the courts often have in 
attaching an income or capital label to a particular amount, 
it is clear that, every amount must be either income or 
capital. It cannot be a mixture of the two. See Crowe V 
C„I.1\. (1930 AD 122) . In Sub-Nigel Limited v C.I.R. (1948 
(4) SA 580 AD) the Appellate Division, although dealing in 
that case with a question of expenditure rather than income, 
stated (at page 595 of the judgment) that it was "impossible 
to give a definition of what is expenditure of a non-capital 
nature which will act as a touchstone in deciding all cases 
and it would be impracticable to attempt such a definition." 
Numerous tests and guidelines have been laid down by the 
courts however in attempting to resolve the issue of whether 
an amount constitutes income or capital (see, for example, 
C.I.R. v George Forest Timber Co Limited (1924 AD 516) , New 
State Areas Limited v C.I.R, (1946 AD 610) and Natal Estates 
Limited V C.I.R. (1975 (4) SA 177 A)). It is however beyond 
the scope of this paper to deal with the question in its 
widest context/ but to restrict the analysis to the prin­
ciples applicable to the receipt or accrual of an amount by 
way of compensation, or damages.
The factual situations in, which a payment of compensation or 
damages has occurred are numerous, but it is possible to 
distinguish several broad categories of factual situations 
(eg. the cancellation of an agency agreement) and, insofar
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as this may be possible, it is proposed to analyse the 
decided cases within the various broad categories.
The initial category with which it is proposed to deal is 
that relating to compensation paid as a result of the loss 
or expropriation of an asset or right. This category 
furthermore contains several of the leading cases dealing 
with the nature of a receipt by way of compensation or 
damages. The leading South African case in this particular 
category is undoubtedly that of C.I.R. v lllovo Sugar 
Estates Limited (17 SAi'C 387; 1951(1) SA 306N-) . In this 
case lllovo Sugar Estates Limited carried on the business of 
sugar cane farming and the manufacturing of sugar. In the 
course of its business it both owned and leased land on 
which canefields were planted. Certain canefields were 
requisitioned by military and naval authorities during the 
war years of 1943 and 1944 for military purposes. In 
respect of land owned by the company/ certain areas were 
taken over by way of lease and in respect of certain land 
which was leased by the company s the military authorities 
either took over the leases or cancelled the leases. The 
company was permitted to reap its standing crops of cane on 
the ground requisitioned by the military, but the cane 
ratoohs which would in the normal course give rise to future 
crops were^ in the process, destroyed. Evidence was pro­
duced to the satisfaction of the court that canefields were 
usually productive for a period of 14 to 16 yeats* and that
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during that period some 6 crops of cane could be expected. 
Furthermore, damage to standing crops of cane was caused*
Compensation was paid to the company in respect of the loss 
of cane destroyed and also in respect of damage done to 
standing drops. The Commissioner for Inland Revenue regar­
ded the various payments as income and assessed them to tax. 
The case was heard by the Special Court and thereafter 
appeals were lodged to the Natal Provincial Division which 
held that the amounts paid for damage to standing crops 
constituted income and were properly assessable to tax. 
However, the amounts paid in respect of the destruction of 
the sugar cane was in fact compensation for the loss of 
portion of the company's income-producing machine and were 
receipts of a capital nature irrespective of whether the 
land was owned or leased by the company. In reaching this 
conclusion the court had regard to what it termed "the true 
nature of a canefield in the economy of a cane grower", and 
was of the view that a canefield constituted a portion of 
the capital of a cane grower, being the "income-producing 
machine" (see page 393).
The principle to be extracted from this case is that where 
compensation is paid for the loss or destruction of an asset 
which forms part of the capital of a business, then that 
compensation itself assumes a capital nature,
In reaching its decision the court applied the case which is 
probably the leading case in this field, namely Glenboiq 
Union Fireclay Company Limited v The Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (1921 SC 400; 12 TC 427)» In this case the company 
had a business consisting in the mining, sale and manufac­
ture of fire-clay, and included in its assets were rights to 
certain seams of fire-clay. A certain area over which it 
held rights to fire-clay was reserved by a railway company 
for the support of its line and an amount was paid to the 
company by way of compensation. It was held, by 6 Judges 
out of 7, in the Court of Session that the compensation was 
not profits but was paid as consideration for a capital 
asset which had been rendered unavailable for the purposes 
of the company's business. It was said by the Lord Presi­
dent (Clyde) that:
"It is obvious that it (ie the compensation) did not 
arise or accrue by or through any of the processes 
whereby the company's trade or business is carried on. 
On the contrary, it was paid because the company was 
prevented from applying any of those processes to the 
fire-clay in the areas affected directly or indirectly 
by the embargo* It was not a profit derived from the 
carrying on of the company's trade or business, it was 
paid because the company was wholly deprived of the 
opportunity to carry on its trade or business so far as 
the fire-clay in the affected areas was concerned *.*•
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we know nothing of how the company dealt v/ith the value 
of its leasehold property in its books, or in framing 
its balance sheets. But prima facie the sterilisation 
of parts of them seems to me to imply a capital loss, 
and the payment of compensation to repair the injury to 
the company's undertaking which flowed from that 
sterilisation seems to me to be a restoration of 
capital."
The case then went on appeal to the House of Lords, where it 
was confirmed that the payment was in fact a capital 
receipt. At page 463 of the Judgment of the House of Lords 
Lord Buckmaster said;
"In truth the sum of money is the sum paid to prevent 
the fire-clay company obtaining the full benefit of the 
capital value of that part of the mines which they are 
prevented from working by the railway company. It 
appears to me to make no difference whether it be 
regarded as a sale of the asset out and out, or whether 
it be treated merely as a means of preventing the 
acquisition of profit that would otherwise be gained, 
in either case the capital asset of the company to that 
extent has been sterilised or destroyed, and it is in 
respect of that action that the sum of E15 360 was 
paid. It is unsound to consider the fact that the 
measure, adopted for the purpose of seeing what the
total amount should be, was baaed on considering what 
are the profits that would have been earned. That, no 
doubt, is a perfectly exact and accurate way of deter­
mining the compensation, for it is now well settled 
that the compensation payable in such circumstances is 
the full value of the minerals that are to be left 
unworked/ less the cost of working, and that is, of 
course/ the profit that would be obtained were they in 
fact worked. But there is no relation between the 
measure that is used for the purpose of Calculating a 
particular result and the quality of the figure that is 
arrived at by means of the application of that test. I 
am unable to regard this sum of money as anything but 
capital money . . ."
The question touched on in the above guotation relating to 
the manner in which compensation is calculated, will be 
dealt with more fully at a later stage, but it may be stated 
here that the fact that compensation is calculated by 
reference to loss of future profits, does not necessarily 
taint that payment as a revenue receipt. Of importance 
howeverr ifc the thread running through both the judgments of 
the court of Sessions and the House of Lords that the loss 
of the rights to the fire-clay seam constituted "a sterili­
sation" of part of the capital sttuctute of the fire-clay 
company. It was accordingly for this sterilisation that the 
company was receiving the compensation which in tuirn was to
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be regarded as capital. The Glenboig case has been cited as 
authority in numerous subsequent South African and English 
cases and may be regarded as laying down a basic principle, 
namely, that where compensation is paid in respect of the 
loss of a capital asset, then that compensation is itself 
capital. The converse of the principle is accordingly that 
where an amount is paid for loss of profits or for loss of a 
revenue item, then the compensation itself will be regarded 
as revenue and accordingly subject to tax.
Other cases dealing with the appropriation of an asset are 
ITG 740 (18 SATO 219) and ITC 835 (21 SATC 328)* In the 
former case the taxpayer was a farmer whose farm was subject 
to a servitude in favour of the SA Railways and Harbours 
who, in terms of the servitude, were entitled to take water 
from the farm. The servitude, which was expropriated under 
statutory authority, entitled the Railways to enter upon the 
farm, sink boreholes and take water therefrom. In return 
the farmer received a payment of compensation. This payment 
was held subject to tax by the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue and on appeal to the Tax Special Court, it was held 
that the transaction by virtue of which the compensation was 
received was akin to a sale, despite the element of expro­
priation, of the water which was a product of the taxpayer's 
farm. The payments were accordingly not in respect of a 
capital asset but were periodical payments far a product of 
the farm and accordingly constituted income. The Court
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distinguished the Glenboig case and held that the corpus of 
the land was left intact and unimpaired.
In ITC 835 the taxpayer was a property dealer and also 
obtained income by way of rents. The Government erected a 
radar station near to certain land owned by the taxpayer 
company and a servitude was granted to the Government 
restricting the height to which buildings could be erected 
on the land in question so as not to interfere with the 
radar station. An amount of compensation was paid in 
respect of the grant of the servitude. The Glenboig case 
was distinguished by the Court on the basis that in the 
present case the land constituted part of the taxpayer's 
stock-in-trade and was a trading asset in the hands of the 
taxpayer. The receipt was accordingly held to form part of 
the taxpayer's tevenue and was not a capital receipt.
Although the above cases have dealt with compensation paid 
as a result of the expropriation of assets, the same princi­
ples are applicable to the receipt of inisurance payments for 
losses suffered.
3 SATC 50) an insurance payment received in 
respect of goods destroyed in transit was held to be a 
taxable receipt. ITC 594 (14 SATC 249) dealt with the 
proceeds of a claim under an insurance policy Covering loss 
of profits. In this case the appellant taxpayer carried on
an engineering business. The taxpayer suffered a fire 
resulting in a loss of profits, which loss it recovered 
under a loss of profits insurance policy. The taxpayer 
contended that the receipt was of a capital nature and in 
the course of delivering its judgment, the Court referred, 
inter alia, to various English decisions. The Court relied 
on the case of Gliksten and Son Limited v Green (8 ATC 46) 
where it was held that an amc-unt received on an insurance 
for the replacement value of a stock of timber destroyed by 
a fire, which was stock-in-trade, was held to be a revenue 
receipt as being in replacement of the stock-in-trade. It 
also referred to the Privy Council decision of Rex v British 
Columbia Fir and Cedar Lumber Company Limited (15 ATC 624?
48 TLR, 284) . This case was directly in point with the case 
Under discussion in that in that case the taxpayer's pre­
mises and plant were insured against loss or damage by fire 
and in addition loss of profits was insured against, in 
holding that an insurance payment in respect of the loss of 
profits policy was a revenue receipt, the Privy Council 
stated:
"This insurance receipt, thereforef was the product of 
a revenue payment prudently mad<2 by the respondents to 
secure that the gains which might have been expected to 
accrue to them had there been no fire should not be 
lost, but should be replaced by a sum equivalent to 
their estimated amount."
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The appeal was therefore dismissed.
In ITC 597 (14 SATC 264) an amount received from an insurer 
under a loss of profits policy, as a result of damage to 
stock by a fire, was also held to be a taxable receipt.
An Appellate Division decision places the seal of approval 
upon the approach adopted in the above cases# namely that 
the receipt of an insurance payment for the loss of profits 
or for the loss of trading items constitutes revenue in the 
hands of the recipient and is subject to tax. The c&^a 
referred to is, of course, that of Sub Nigel Limited (supra) 
where the Court was in fact concerned whether premiums of 
insurance payable oh a particular insurance policy were 
deductible or not. In reaching its conclusion the Court 
dealt with the question of whether the proceeds of the 
policy would be capital or income, in this case the appel­
lant company was a gold mining company which as a matter of 
course held policies of insurance against loss of net 
profits and standing charges. The rationale for the policy 
in regard to loss of profits was that the company wished to 
maintain its earnings should a fire occur interrupting 
production. Furthermore, in the event of a cessation of 
operations certain essential services and maintenance would 
have to continue which would involve the company in on-going 
costs, referred to as standing charges* Certain costs in 
regard to the retention of the labour force would also be
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on-going. The evidence before the Court was that a failure 
to insure against standing charges could seriously affect 
the financial standing of the, company in the event of the 
cessation of operations due to fire. The company sought to 
deduct the insurance premiums paid on the policies and the 
matter eventually came before the Appellate Division. In 
the course of deciding the question, the Court stated that 
the purpose of the insurance was to ensure that the company 
received an income in the event of a fire which would 
prevent the normal incomer-producing operations. At page 592 
CentliVers, J.A. said:
"There can, to my mind, be no doubt that, if a fire had 
occurred, the proceeds paid by the company’s insurer in 
respect of the policies insuring net profits would have 
been of a non-capital nature and would therefore have 
had to be included in the company's "gross income" as 
defined ... see Rex v B.C. Fir and Cedar Lumber Company 
Limited *..
Even apart from the above authority, it is difficult to 
understand how such proceeds could be regarded as 
receipts of a capital nature within the meaning of 
"gross income" as defined in Section 7. similarly it 
seems to me that the proceeds of the policies in 
respect of the standing charges would also be Of a 
non-capital nature .**"
He then went on to say:
"To adapt the language used by the Privy Council in Rex 
v B.C., Fir and Cedar Lumber Company Limited ... the 
effect of complying v/ith Section 12(c) (the account 
being otherwise in credit) would necessarily be to 
increase by the amount of the monies received f,rom the 
insurer the taxable income of the company."
In the course of its judgment the Court analysed certain 
English decisions relating to situations similar to that 
before the Court. There appeared to be a conflict among the 
English cases insofar as the cases of Rhymney Iron Company 
Limited v Fowler (1896 (2) QBD 79) and Thomas Merthyr 
Colliery Co Limited v Davis (1933 (1) KB 349) seem to 
indicate that money received by taxpayers for purposes of 
indemnifying them against loss of profits would not be a 
trading receipt and would not be subject to income tar.; 
whereas the Court of Appeal in C.I.R. v Williams Executors 
(1943 (1) ABR 318) and the Privy Council in Rex v B.C. Fir 
and Cedar Lumber Company Limited (supra) appeared to indi­
cate to the contrary.
Centlivers, J*A. at page 59? and following decided that the 
former two cases were not to be followed and that English 
law may differ from our law in this respect and that "such 
monies do not constitute receipts of a capital nature". The
Court therefore concluded that as any receipts of the 
insurance policy would be of a revenue nature, the premiums 
Were deductible as they were expended in order to produce 
income. The decision is, with respect, a satisfying and 
correct one.
Despite the reservations expressed by Centlivers, J.A. in 
regard to the applicability of English decisions in this 
area of the law, there are certain decisions which are 
informative and instructive and, with respect, in accordance 
with the principles enunciated by our own Courts. In the 
case of Gray & Co Limited v Murphy (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) 
(2.3 TC 225) the Court was asked to decide whether certain 
monies payable to the taxpayer company pursuant to an 
accident insurance policy over members Of its staff were 
liable to tax* The facts were that the taxpayer1 company had 
for several years taken out accident insurance policies in 
terms of which the company would receive compensation in the 
e^ent of accident to members of its staff. The monies were 
payable irrespective of whether or not the company had any 
liability to its employee as a result of the accident* In 
1935 the company's works manager suffered a fatal accident 
and the company received a payment in terms of the policy.
An ex gratia payment had been made to the employee's widow. 
Both the receipt and the payment had been entered in the 
company's profit and loss account, MacNaghten J. argued 
that if an employee was injured so that he was temporarily
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unable to fulfil his duties, the company would nevertheless 
remain liable ,o pay his wages which would be treated as a 
trading expense. Any aitiounts which the company x'eceived 
under its insurance policy would similarly be treated as 
income. He then enquired whether the fact that an employee 
was killed or totally disabled would make any difference to 
the question. He concluded that it should not and that the 
payments received by the company should be regarded as 
income. The amount received by the company was accordingly 
liable to tax but the ex gratia payment to the widow was not 
deductible.
A similar case came before the House of Lords, namely 
William'a Bxecutors v C.I.R. (26 TC 23). In this case the 
company was a beneficiary under policies against the death 
or disablement by accident of its directors. In 1938 one of 
the directors died as a result Of an accident and the 
company received the proceeds of the policy from the insur­
ance company. The question then arose whether the receipt 
was income or capital in the hands of the company. It was 
proved that the deceased director had particular experience 
and expertise which was of great value to the company. It 
was held by the House of Lords that the payment was a 
revenue payment and was taxable. In the course of delive­
ring judgment, Lord Greene, M.R, stated the following 
general principles at page 35:
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"If a company insures its stock goods against fire and 
that stock is destroyed by fire, however great and 
valuable it may be, the receipts must be treated in 
exactly the same manner as receipts from a sale of the 
goods would have been treated. The trader, it is true, 
as has been said, does not trade in fires but in goods, 
but if he disposes of the whole of his stock by sale or 
if the whole of his stock is destroyed by fire and the 
insurance money is received, there can be no ground for 
differentiating for tax purposes between the purchase 
money and the insurance money.
It seems to me that the benefits derived from a service 
contract fall into the same broad class, Suppose a 
company has a particularly valuable servant engaged 
under a contract of service* So long as that Contract 
remains in force the salary which the company pays is 
expenditure on revenue account. The benefits which the 
company receives ere reflected in its output and the 
profits that it makes. They are equally matters for 
revenue account. If during the course of that employ­
ment the servant is temporarily incapacitated the 
company's revenue account is affected by reason of the 
fact that during the incapacity it produces less goods 
or earns less profits, if the company takes out a
policy for a sum which the director is to make or 
fairly represents the loss or part of the loss - it
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matters not -* which they will suffer if they are 
deprived of those services, can it be said that the 50 
pounds a week, or whatever the figure may be, that the 
company receives under such a policy is anything but a 
revenue receipt? .,. The important matter is the 
object of the insurance, which may or may not be 
entirely achieved according to the accuracy of the 
estimate made."
Although the Court stated that this case was different to 
Gray1s case, the result was the same, and in essence, it is 
difficult to see on what basis the Court regarded the two 
cases as distinguishable. The above two cases are, it is 
believed, in accordance with the principles of South African 
law in that the compensation paid for the loss of services 
of employees or directors is, to use the terminology used in 
Burmah Steamship Company case (1931 SC 156) , to fill a 
hole in the company's income rather than in its income- 
producing machine. In other words, the employees or direc­
tors of a company do not constitute its capital and the loss 
of an employee is not a capital loss. It is perhaps con­
ceivable that in certain situations this may not be the 
case, for instance, where the business is the provision of 
particular personal services which can be rendered only by a 
particular person or persons. In that case it may well be 
that the services of the person in question constitute the 
capital or the income-producing machinery of the business in
Page 20.
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question and that the loss of such a person would be a 
capital loss.
The receipt or accrual of any amount under any policy of 
insurance upon the life of any person who, at any time while 
the policy was in force, was an employee of the taxpayer or, 
where the taxpayer is a company, was a director or employee 
of that company, is now dealt with in terms of paragraph (m) 
of the definition of gross income in Section 1 of the Act. 
Paragraph (m) provides that to be included in gross income 
is "any amount received or accrued under or upon the surren­
der or disposal of, or by way of any loan or advance granted 
on or after 1 July 1982, by the insurer concerned under or 
upon the security of, any policy of insurance upon the life 
of any person who, at any time while the policy was in 
force, was an employee of the taxpayer or, where the tax­
payer is a company, was a director or employee of that 
company, if any premium paid in. respect of such policy is or 
was deductible from the taxpayer's income, whether in the 
current or any previous year of assessment, under the 
provisions of Section 11: Provided that where any amount 
received or accrued under or upon the surrender or disposal 
of any such policy falls to be included in the taxpayer's 
gross income, the amount so to be included in his gross 
income shall be reduced by the amount of any loan or advance 
under or upon the security of that policy which has been 
Included in his gross income, whether in the current or any
previous year of. assessment? provided further that where any 
such policy has been terminated by the insurer and a paid-up 
policy has been issued the terminated policy and the paid-up 
policy shall for the purposes of this paragraph be deemed to 
be one and the same policy".
It is not. proposed to deal any further with this provision 
but for a. further discussion of this paragraph see Silke on 
South African Income Tax, 10th Edition, paragraph 4.57.
l‘he above discussion has dealt with the case where the 
proceeds of a policy following on th6 death or disablement 
vf an employee are payable to the employer. The question, 
course, also arises in regard to a person who takes out a 
policy in terms of which he himself will be paid an amount 
should he either temporarily or permanently become disabled 
and be unable to work for a living. In an article appearing 
in the Income Tax Reporter, Volume 10, at page 153, it is 
stated that normally an insurance premium is only deductible 
in terms of Section 11(w) of the Act. Furthermore it is 
stated that it can hardly be argued that the premium is laid 
out '‘wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade" as 
required by Section 23 of the Act and that accordingly a 
prewiuffl would not be deductible. Furthermore compensation 
for personal injury is to be regarded as being of the nature 
of capital. Reference is made to the English ease of 
Forsyth V Thompson (23 TC 374) where it Was held that
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payments by way of sickness benefits to a permanently 
disabled dentist were held liable to tax as being payments 
in the nature of an annuity. However, the loss of an 
ability to earn an income must surely be regarded as the 
loss of a capital asset in the same way that payments in 
restraint of trade are regarded as capital payments. The 
above analysis that premiums on a disability policy are not 
deductible and that the proceeds thereof are capital would 
appear to be correct. It is, however, apparently the 
practice of the Department to allow the deduction of the* 
premiums and to subject the proceeds of the policy to tax 
(in this regard see Volume 11, Income Tax Reporter, page IT 
and Silke, op. cit., paragraph 7.33),
The above discussion, of employees leads conveniently to the 
next broad category to be discussed, namely compensation 
payable as a result of loss of employment. The position is 
now governed by the Act and paragraph (d) of the definition 
of gross income in Section 1 includes in gross income "any 
amount, including any voluntary award, received or accrued 
in respect of the relinquishment, termination, loss, 
repudiation, cancellation or variation of any office or 
employment or of any appointment (or right or claim to b& 
appointed) to any office or employment? provided that the. 
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any lump sum 
award from any pension fund, provident fund, retirement 
annuity fund or benefit fund."
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payments by way of sickness benefits to a permanently 
disabled dentist were held liable to tax as being payments 
in the nature of an annuity. However, the loss of an 
ability to earn an income must surely be regarded as the 
loss of a capital asset in the same way that payments in 
restraint of trade are regarded as capital payments. The 
above analysis that premiums on a disability policy are not 
deductible and that the proceeds thereof are capital would 
appear to be cox*rect. It is, however, apparently the 
practice of the Department to allow the deduction of the 
premiums and to subject the proceeds of the policy to tax 
(in this regard see Volume 11, Income Tax Reporter, page 17 
and Silke, op. cit., paragraph 7*33).
The above discussion of employees leads conveniently to the 
next broad category to be discussed, namely compensation 
payable as a result of loss of employment* The position is 
now governed by the Act and paragraph (d) of the definition 
of gross income in Section 1 includes in gross income "any 
amount, including any voluntary award, received or accrued 
in respect of the relinquishment, termination, loss, 
repudiation, cancellation or variation of any office or 
employment or of any appointment (or right or claim to be 
appointed) to any office or employment; provided that the 
provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any lump sum 
award from any pension fund, provident fund, retirement 
annuity fund or benefit fund."
The above amounts referred to may qualify for the exemption 
provided in Section 10(1)(*/ of the Act (presently R30 000) 
if the various provisos laid down in that Section are 
complied with, namely that the person has attained the age 
of 55 years in the case of a male or 50 years in the case of 
a female; or the Commissioner is satisfied that the termi­
nation or impending termination of such persons' services or 
the relinquishment, termination, loss, repudiation, cancel­
lation or variation of his office ox employment or of his 
appointment (or claim to be appointed, to any office or 
employment) is due to superannuation, ill health or other 
infirmity; or in the case of a female, the Commissioner is 
sau^ufied that she relinquished or terminated her office or 
services in order to marry.
There are however certain cases dealing with compensation 
foi the loss of office or employment which may briefly be 
referred to as it is believed that they shed some light on 
the general principles applicable to the tax treatment of 
compensation and damages.
In ITC 6 (1 SATC 54), two years prior to the completion of a 
5 year service agreement with a company, the company went 
into liquidation and the appellant's contract w«o cancelled. 
In return for his agreement to the cancellation of the 
contract, the appellant was paid a consideration* The Court 
held that the receipt was of the nature of income and was
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accordingly taxable. This approach has, however, not been 
followed.
In CIR v Hersov (18 SATC 20; 1952 (1) SA 485A) the facts 
were that Hersov had held office as a permanent director of 
Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investment Company Limited in 
respect of which he was entitled to an annual remuneration. 
Hersov also held directorships in various subsidiary com­
panies in the mining group. Anglovaal sought a listing on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and, as a condition to the 
listing, Hersov was required to give up his rights to a 
permanent directorship. An agreement was accordingly 
entered into in terms of which Hersov agreed to waive his 
right to permanent directorship and to vote in favour of the 
necessary amendments to the company's Memorandum and 
Articles of Association. A sum of £6 250,0C was paid to 
Hersov in terms of the agreement. The agreement also 
provided for certain other matters, including that Hersov 
would apply for the allotment and issue of 12 500 shares in 
the company at par ie. £3 125. The market value of the 
shares at that date was considerably higher. The Appellate 
Division eventually held that in view of the fact that 
Hersov would continue to be remunerated should he remain in 
the service of the company, there was no ground for pre­
suming that the consideration which was passing was given 
for services rendered or to be rendered* Xt was held that 
the true consideration for the allocation of the shares was
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the waiver by Hersov of his rights and his agreement to vote 
in favour of the implementation of that waiver. The receipt 
was found to be of a capital nature and not subject to tax.
-*-n ITC 463 (11 SATC 196) the taxpayer was the managing 
director of the company and the holder of certain shares in 
the company* A dispute arose with other shareholders and it 
was agreed that the taxpayer would transfer his shares to 
another shareholder and resign as managing director of the 
company. In return the taxpayer would receive the sum of 
£2 000 in cash from the other shareholder and an amount of 
£25 per month from the company for a period of 10 years.
The taxpayer objected to the inclusion of the £25 per month 
payments in his income tax assessment and the Court allowed 
his appeal on the basis that the consideration was a payment 
in respect of his ceasing to have an interest in the company 
and was accordingly of a capital nature. The judgment is, 
with respect, not very satisfactory in that it does not deal 
in any detail with the reason for concluding that the 
taxpayer's interest in the company was of a capital nature* 
The major portion of the judgment is devoted to the question 
of whether the fact that the payments were made on a 
periodical basis necessarily resulted in those payments 
being regarded as income (which is an aspect which will be 
discussed at a later stage).
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The approach adopted in both Hersov’s case and ITC 463 is in 
accordance with the decisions of the English Courts, of 
which it is proposed to mention but two. The first case to 
be dealt with is that of Chlbbett (HM Inspector of Taxes) v 
Joseph Robinson and Sons (9 TC 48) in which case the respon­
dents were a firm of ship managers who were employed as such 
by a particular steamship company. Their remuneration 
consisted of a share in the profits of their client company. 
That company went into liquidation in 1918 and investments 
were distributed among the shareholders. Certain National 
War Bonds were distributed to the respondents "as compensa­
tion for loss of office". Thereafter the business of the 
old company including its remaining assets was transferred 
to a new company of which new company the respondents were 
again appointed managers. The respondent taxpayer contended 
that the amount awarded to it for its loss of office in the 
old company was a voluntary payment made to them as compen­
sation for the loss of profits of their employment under the 
old company and was not liable to tax. This argument was 
upheld by the Court, At page 61 of the judgment Rowlatt, o. 
said:
"If it was a payment in respect of the termination of 
their employment I do not think that is taxable, 1 do 
not think that is taxable as a profit. It seems to me 
that a payment to make up for cessation for the future 
of annual taxable profits i.s not itself an annual
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profit at all. ... but at any rate it does seem to me 
that compensation for loss of an employment which need 
not continue, but which was likely to continue, is not 
an annual profit within the scope of the Income Tax Act 
at all.w
A similar result was reached in the case of Duff (HM Inspec­
tor of Taxes) v Barlow (23 TC 633) . In this case the 
taxpayer was the managing director of a manufacturing 
company. This company purchased a subsidiary company in 
order to secure a supply of raw material and the management 
of the subsidiary company was largely the responsibility of 
the taxpayer, together with another director. It was agreed 
between the taxpayer and the company that the taxpayer would 
be specially remunerated for his management of the subsi­
diary company by way of a share in the profits of the 
subsidiary. The profits of the subsidiary proved to be 
higher than expected and no additional payment was made to 
the taxpayer, instead it was agreed that the original 
arrangement should be terminated in the interests of the 
holding company and the taxpayer agreed to accept the sum of 
£4 000 as compensation for the loss of his right to future 
remuneration under the earlier agreement* He continued in 
his capacity as managing director of the holding company.
It was held by the High Court of Justice that the compensa­
tion received by the taxpayer did not result from a contract 
of employment nor was it remuneration for services rendered
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or to be rendered by him; it was compensation for giving up 
a right to remuneration. The amount was found not to be 
taxable.
Clearly the Courts, both in South Africa and in England, 
regarded the termination of a contract of employment and the 
subsequent loss of future income as a loss of a capital 
nature. The rationale underlying these decisions is surely 
that an individual's income-producing machine is the service 
which he can render under a contract of employment and that 
the early termination of such a contract is a sterilisation 
of the person's capital asset or his income-producing 
machine. In order to render such payments liable to tax it 
was accordingly necessary to insert paragraph (d) of the 
definition of gross income in Section 1 of the Act.
A variation on the theme of payments to employees is to be 
found in the case 1TC 1289 (41 SATC 149). In this case the 
appellant was employed as a project manager in order to 
manage sales projects. The employer was dissatisfied with 
the results of the sales projects managed by the appellant 
and, without the knowledge of the appellant, caused two 
letters to be sent. The first letter was addressed to 
manufacturers stating that the appellant was no longer 
employed by the company# and the second letter was sent to 
the staff of the company stating that the appellant had 
resigned and left the company. A dispute between the
hi*
appellant and his employer resulted, which attracted the 
attention of the press. Eventually an agreement was reached 
whereby the appellant’s employment was terminated and he 
received a sum of R40 0 00 from the company, being RIO 000 in 
lieu of salary and R30 000 as "hush money" to avoid adverse 
publicity which the company would suffer were the appellant 
to institute action for defamation. It was held that the 
R30 000 did not relate to services rendered by the appellant 
but that the payment was as compensation for the attack On 
his reputation which was of a capital nature. The Court 
explained the position as follows:
"The appellant had a reputation of being an outstanding 
sales promoter which, in my view, is the appellant's 
ability to earn income and is comparable to his 
"income-producing machine". The tarnishing of his 
reputation is, therefore, of a capital nature in that 
his ability to earn income is diminished. The agree­
ment not to sue is a restraint to claim compensation 
for his r<=sduc6d capacity to earn income."
The amount was accordingly not liable to tax. This case 
again underlines the attitude of the Courts that the ability 
or capacity of an individual to earn income is an asset of a 
capital nature and that any diminution of that ability or 
capacity giving rise to a payment of compensation would
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result in that payment of compensation itself being of a 
capital nature.
A leading case in the field of the tax treatment of damages 
and compensation received is the Burmah steamship Company 
Limited case (supra). The Burmah Steamship Company had 
purchased a second-hand ship which required repair. Ship­
builders were engaged to complete the repairs considered 
necessary but the repairs were not completed within the time 
period stipulated. Eventually a sum was paid to the Burmah 
Steamship Company by way of damages. The damages were 
calculated on the estimated profits which the ship would 
have earned had the shipbuilders not been late in completing 
the repairs. The question of whether the receipt was of the 
nature of income or capital fell to be decided. The Court 
argued that if one of the company's vessels had been char­
tered and the charter breached, the damages recovered would 
be a revenue item* "The reason would be that the breach of 
the charter was an injury inflicted on the appellant's 
trading, making (so to speak) a hole in the appellants' 
profits *.."« The Court then stated that if a vessel was 
sunk giving rise to a claim for damages, the result would be 
different. At page 160 the following was stated:
"I imagine that there could be no doubt that the 
damages so recovered could not enter the appellants 
profit and loss account; because the destruction of
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the vessel would be an injury inflicted t not on the 
appellants' trading, but on the capital assets of the 
appellants' trade, making (so to speak) a hole in them; 
and the damages could therefore on the same princi­
ples as before - only be used to fill that hole".
After referring to the Glenboig case the Court went on to 
say:
"It is very relevant to enquire whether the thing, in 
respect of which the taxpayer has recovered damages or 
compensation* is deprivation of one of the capital 
assets of his trading enterprise, or - short of that, a 
mere restriction of his trading opportunities."
The Court therefore found that the Burmah Steamship Company 
had not been deprived of a capital asset but simply of a 
trading opportunity and accordingly the compensation paid 
for the late completion of the repairs was a proper item for 
the profit and loss account. In the terminology adopted by 
the Court, the compensation was received for a hole in the 
profits of the taxpayer.
In an interesting obiter remark, Lord Sands (at page 161) 
stated that:
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"li the shipping company had seen their way to present 
the matter on the footing of an abatement from the 
contract price/ it would have been very difficult for 
the Revenue to have maintained that the fc.3000 was 
anything else but a capital saving."
Tiit* cancellation of employment contracts has already been 
discussed/ and the next broad category which falls to be 
dealt with is the cancellation of other agreements, the most 
common example being agency contracts. Silke, op. cit, 
paragraph 3,23/ states that?
"In order for compensation for the cancellation of a 
trading contract to constitute a sum of a capital 
nature, it is sufficient if the contract constitutes a 
substantial part of the business, and the cancellation 
need not have the effect of destroying or materially 
crippling the whole of the taxpayer's income-producing 
structure k"
This test is substantially re-stated by Advocate Broomberg 
ui his book "Tax Strategy", 2nd Edition, at page 200* This 
doctrine has its origin in English case law, the leading 
cases being Short Brothers Limited v I R C  (12 TC 9SS) and Van 
Den Berghs (supra)* The case of Short Brothers, like the 
Burmah Steamship Company case, is a case which smacks of the 
sea. Xn this case the taxpayer was a shipbuilder* $he case
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revolved around compensation received pursuant to tbf 
cancellation of two contracts. In the first contract the 
taxpayer had contracted to build two ships but had agreed to 
cancel the contracts in consideration for a payment of 
£100 000. In the second instance the company had agreed to 
build a steamship but before work had commenced, the custo­
mer went into liquidation and the taxpayer agreed with the 
liquidator to cancel the contract in return for compensation 
of the order of £35 000. The question of whether these 
payments were subject to tax came ultimately before the 
Court of Appeal which up.ie.i< the decision, of Rowlatt, £f. to 
the effect that the receipts were simply trading receipts 
"in the course of a going business"* As the Court pointed 
out, Short Brothers were in no way restricted from carrying 
on their trade and the compensation which they received 
represented simply the profits which they would have made 
had the contract been proceeded with, and it was therefore 
this "hole" which was being filled.
In Van Den Berghs* case the facts were that the appellant 
company was a manufacturer and dealer in margarine and 
similar products. Their main competitor was a Dutch company 
and in 1908 an agreement was entered into between the two 
companies in terms of which they agreed to share their 
profits, not to enter into any pooling or price arrangements 
with third parties to the detriment of the two companies, to 
set up a joint committee to deal with various aspects of the
business, to promote generally the interests of the two 
companies in the margarine business, and several other 
points of co-operation. The intention of the agreement was 
to avoid competition between the two companies. Various 
supplemental agreements were entered into at a later stage. 
During the period of the first World War the two companies 
were unable to compute their profits and an attempt was made 
to continue with the agreement after the cessation of 
hostilities. In 1922 the taxpayer computed that the sum of 
some £449 000 was owed to it by the Dutch company. This was 
not admitted by the Dutch company and the question went to 
arbitration. After lengthy and expensive, but inconclusive, 
arbitration proceedings, a settlement was reached in terms 
of which the Dutch company paid £450 000 to the appellant 
company "as damages". The agreements between the companies 
were also cancelled. The importance of these agreements was 
referred to by the House of Lords in the following terms:
"The three agreements which the appellant consented to 
cancel were not ordinary commercial contracts made in 
the course of carrying on their trade; they were not 
contracts for the disposal of their products or for the 
engagement of agents or other employees necessary for 
the conduct of their business; nor were they merely 
agreements as to how their trading profits when earned 
should be distributed as between the contracting 
parties. On the contrary, the cancelled agreements
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related to the whole structure of the appellant's 
profit making apparatus. They regulated the appel­
lant's activities, defined what they ftight and what 
they might not do, and affected the whole conduct of 
their business. I have difficulty in seeing how money 
laid out to secure, or money received for the cancel­
lation of, so fundamental an organisation of the 
traders' activities can be regarded as an income 
disbursement or an income receipt. ... in my opinion 
that asset, the congeries of rights which the appellant 
has enjoyed under the agreements and which for a price 
they surrendered# was a capital asset."
The amounts received by the taxpayer were therefore not 
subject to tax.
Another English case of importance is that of Barr, Crombie 
and Co Limited V IRC (26TC 406). Under certain agreements, 
the taxpayer managed the ships of a shipping company for 
which it received a remuneration on a commission basis. It 
was specifically provided in the original agreements that if 
the shipping company should go into liquidation or cease to 
carry on business, compensation being the remuneration from 
the period of the date of liquidation until the date of 
expiry of the agreements would immediately become due to the 
taxpayer. The shipping company went into liquidation and an 
amount was duly paid to the taxpayer. The taxpayer
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contended that the compensation was in respect of the loss 
of an agency which was fundamental to its business. In 
support of this contention it was proved that over 88 per 
cent of the taxpayer's income was derived from its 
management agreement with the shipping company. The company 
was successful in its contentions, and the Court held that 
the sum was a capital payment and not a trading receipt.
The Court stated at page 411 that payment was received as 
the price of the surrender by the taxpayer of its only 
important capital asset.
The leading South African case on the termination of con­
tracts is undoubtedly that of Taeuber and Corssen (Fty) 
Limited v SIR (37SATC 129; 1975 (3) SA 649 AD). The tax­
payer in this case acted as an agent and distributor of 
chemicals, scientific instruments, photographic equipment 
and the like on behalf of German principals and had done so 
for a considerable period. Originally the business between 
the parties was conducted on a basis of good faith but in 
1954 a formal agreement was entered into between a German 
company and the South African company. The contract was an 
on-going contract subject however to the right of termina­
tion at specified intervals. It was specially provided that 
in the event of termination, the German company would be 
entitled to impose a restraint of trade on the South African 
taxpayer to the effect that for a period of 2 years after 
the expiry of the contract, the taxpayer should not compete
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in the sale or supply of chemicals produced by the German 
supplier. In 1966 the German company formed a subsidiary in 
South Africa for the purpose of supplying its chemicals to 
Southern Africa and accordingly the agreement was terminated 
and the restraint of trade was made operative. In respect 
thereof compensation was paid to the taxpayer, which pay­
ments the Secretary for Inland Revenue included in the 
company's taxable income. The company objected to this and 
the Appellate Division eventually held that the restraint 
had the effect of reducing the scope of the appellant's 
income-producing machine which constituted a capital asset* 
Accordingly the compensation paid in respect of such result 
was a receipt of a capital nature.
The basic principle that in order for compensation in 
respect of the cancellation of an agreement to constitute a 
receipt of a capital nature, it is necessary that the 
agreement must have been a substantial part of the tax­
payer 's business is illustrated in several other cases. A 
somewhat, unsatisfactory case however is ITC 333 (8 SATC 333) 
in which compensation was paid to a company which had been 
formed to carry on business as sole agents for the sale of 
coal by a certain colliery in respect of the cancellation of 
the agency agreements. It was held that the amount of 
compensation had been received in lieu of future income and 
that it therefore partook of the same nature as income. The 
case is unsatisfactory in that no attempt is made to analyse
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the effect which the cancellation of the agreements had on 
the business of the taxpayer and the importance of the 
agreements to the continued viability of the taxpayer was 
not analysed or even mentioned. The Court approached the 
question simply on the basis that the amounts were received 
instead of future income and that therefore the lump sum 
payment was itself income* It cannot be said on the facts 
contained in the reported judgment whether the decision was 
correct or not but clearly the approach of the Court was, 
with respect, incorrect* A case which suffers a similar 
deficiency is 1TC 527 (12 SATC 430) where compensation paid 
to the South African agents of an English manufacturing firm 
for the cancellation of an agency agreement was held to be a 
receipt of a revenue nature and taxable. The same Judge as 
XTC 333 namely, Dr Manfred Nathan K*C*, dealt with the 
matter and, with respect, was guilty of the same misdirec­
tion as to the essential enquiry. Despite reference to 
numerous of the leading English cases on the subject, the 
Court appeared to regard as relevant only the fact that the 
amount was being received by way of loss of future profits 
and no attempt was made to analyse the importance of the 
agency agreement in the structure of the taxpayer's 
business.
A far more satisfactory analysis is to be found in ITC 1259 
(39 SATC 65) where the taxpayer was a trust company which 
carried on the business of executors, trustees, liquidators,
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administrators, etc. It had concluded a management contract 
with C. Limited in terms of which it undertook to manage 
extensive properties held by C. Limited* The obligations 
flowing from the agreement were such that the taxpayer was 
required to expand its staff, establish new branches and 
expand existing branches. Control of C. Limited changed and 
the management agreement was cancelled,, Compensation was 
paid and the usual question arose as to whether the amount 
received was capital or not. It was found by the Court that 
the management agreement formed a substantial permanent part 
of the appellant's income-producing structure and that the 
receipt was therefore of a capital nature. The Court 
referred to the various English authorities and said that 
whether the rights and advantages surrendered on the 
cancellation of a contract were such as to destroy or 
materially cripple the whole structure of the recipient's 
profit making apparatus was essentially a question of 
degree. The test then stated by Silke and quoted above, was 
set out at page 69 of the Judgment from which it is clear 
that compensation paid for the parting by the recipient of a 
substantial part of its business undertaking (not necessari­
ly the whole of its business) is sufficient to render 
compensation in respect thereof capital in nature.
The above tests were re-stated in ITC 1341 (43 SATC 215), a 
case in which the taxpayer company provided share transfer 
and similar services primarily to two groups of companies.
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Although similar services were provided to other customers 
as well, this did not form a significant part of the tax­
payer’s business. The one group of companies terminated its 
services with \ihe taxpayer and it was found by the Court 
that the services rendered to that group of companies 
constituted some 20% of the taxpayer's business. This, held 
the Court, was a sufficiently material dislocation of the 
taxpayer's business to render the compensation payable for 
such termination capital in nature. A material part of the 
taxpayer's business had been destroyed, an important "limb 
of the fruit-bearing tree was chopped off" and this could 
not be regarded as an ordinary incident in the course of 
business *
It appears therefore that in South African law the loss of a 
fifth of a taxpayer's business will be sufficiently 
substantial to constitute such a capital loss. The English 
Courts however appear to be somewhat more difficult to 
satisfy and seem to require a greater degree of loss before 
accepting such a loss as a capital loss. In Anglo-French 
Exploration Co Limited v Clayson (Inspector of Taxes) (1956 
(1) AER 762) the loss of one agency out of eight contracts 
was held to be a normal trading risk and that the compensa­
tion payable was therefore a trading receipt. In the course 
of its judgment the Court stated that such receipts would be 
regarded as being received in the ordinary course of trade 
"unless the transaction involves a parting by the recipient
with a substantial part of its business undertaking"* 
Reference was also made to Fleming1s case (33 TC 57) where 
Lord Russell appeared to indicate that a substantial part of 
its business undertaking was one in respect of which the 
loss of which would be "such as to destroy or materially 
cripple the whole structure of the recipient's profit making 
apparatus."
In the case of Kelsall Parsons and Co v IRC (21 TC 608) the 
receipt of an amount of compensation in respect of the loss 
of an agency was held to be a revenue receipt despite the 
fact that the agency which had been terminated in some years 
yielded as much as half the total gross commission received 
by the taxpayer. Although the agency was admittedly an 
important one, the Court was not of the view that its loss 
was other than an ordinary loss to be expected in the normal 
course of business.
Other cases dealing with compensation payable due to the 
cancellation of contracts are:
Verrinder Limited v CIR (1949 (2) SA 147 T) where it was 
held that an ex gratia lump sum payment made to a company in 
respect of the termination of a contract in terms of which 
it had the sole right to purchase goods from an overseas 
company and to advance the sale of such goods in South 
Africa# had been made in recognition of past services by the
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company and to compensate it for loss of future profits, 
formed part of the company's gross income.
Sabine (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Lookers Limited (38 TC 120) 
where the taxpayer was a motor dealer and a major distri­
butor of Austin motor vehicles. The format of the distri­
bution agreement was changed which resulted in the taxpayer 
being far less secure regarding renewals of the agreement 
than it had been in the past. Compensation was paid to the 
taxpayer in respect of the alterations to the contract.
After some difficulty the Court reached the conclusion that 
the agreement "in effect laid down the conditions tinder 
which Lookers had to trade and earn their profits." The 
variations to the contract were of a material nature sub­
stantially affecting the trade of Lookers and accordingly 
the receipt was a capital receipt*
Finally reference may be made to the case of Jesse Robinson 
and Sons v IRC (12 TC 1241) in which compensation was paid 
in respect of the cancellation of contracts for the sale of 
yarn. It was contended on behalf of the taxpayer that the 
amounts paid were damages for breach of contract and not 
trading receipts or profits. The Court, however, held that 
the amounts were indeed trading receipts and profits.
A further category, or perhaps sub-category, are amounts 
payable as a result of the cancellation of lease agreements.
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It is trite tax law that the receipt of rental payments is a 
receipt on revenue account, When a lease agreement is 
cancelled the question, of course, arises whether* the 
compensation paid to the lessor still retains an income 
character or whether it acquires a capital nature* The 
decided cases clearly Indicate that the receipt of compensa­
tion in such circumstances is a revenue receipt. In ITC 312 
(8 SATC 154) the taxpayer let portions of a building owned 
by it. Portion of the building was let under a 5 year 
lease, however some 2 years before the termination date the 
lessees sought to cancel the lease. The taxpayer permit^d 
the cancellation on payment of the rental for the remaining 
period after allowing a one-third discount. After some 
correspondence an amount less than two-thirds of the 
remaining rentals was settled upon and the lease was 
cancelled. This sum was included by the Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue in the income of the lessor, to which it 
objected. The Special Tax Court confirmed the assessment, 
holding that the payment arose out of the contract of lease 
and was therefore a receipt on income account* Similarly in 
ITC i?,7 9 (40 SATC 254) the lessor taxpayer had leased 
premises for a period of 20 years, The leased premises were 
let for the purpose of conducting the business of a bottle 
store and it was a term of the lease that the lessee would 
not apply for a transfer of the liquor licence to other 
premises without the consent of the lessor. After some 
seven years, the lessee wished to remove the liquor licence
Page A4 u
and sought the lessor's permission. After some negotiation
1 figure of R15 000 was settled on being the amount which 
tin: .1.cssoi. required to permit the cancellation of the lease 
thu removal of the liquor licence» The taxpayer adopted 
tbt- attitude that this amount was a capital accrual as the 
t aiaoval of the liquor licence had, so the taxpayer alleged, 
n tfeotec? its ability to let other shops in the shopping 
centre as the bottle, store had been an attraction or, 
alternatively, compensation for alterations to the premises 
consequent upon the removal* It was found by the Court that 
‘ hi sum of 2U5 000 represented the capitalised value of 
ruture- rentals and that the sum was consequently in the 
r-. -*>f revenue, not capital*
t .v „: rfiairiti approach in regard to the cancellation of lease 
agreements has been adopted by the English Courts. For 
instance in the case of Greyhound Racing Association "
(Liverpool) Limited v Cooper (HM Inspector of Taxes) (20 TC 
373) the appellant acquired a racing track, originally on 
lease but it thereafter purchased the property. The racing 
track was leased by the appellant to another company in 
■'.•■‘KBideration of a percentage of the gross takings, subject 
*•., certain minimum payments. The lessee was placed in 
voluntary liquidation and it was agreed that the lease 
agreement would be surrendered if a new company were formed 
to take over the track at a lower rental and also that a sum 
equal to the difference between the old and the new rentals
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was paid to the appellant. It was argued on behalf of thi-* 
appellant that this amount was of a capital nature in 
respect of the diminished value of the goodwill of the 
company for the period in question. This argument 6id m>t 
find favour with the Court which held that the sunt' was ex 
trading receipt and subject to tax. The Court stated:
"The question as to what receipts are revenue and what 
are capital has given rise to much difference oi 
opinion; but it is clear, in my opinion, that, xt ti'u- 
sum in question is received for what is in truth the 
user of capital assets and not for their realisation, 
it is a revenue receipt, not a capital."
The compensation paid was held to be no more than a lump sun. 
payment in place of future rentals.
A variation on the theme is to be found in ITC 175 (5 SATC 
180) where a lease was cancelled at the instance of a lesser 
and the compensation was paid to the lessee. The Commis­
sioner sought to include this amount in the income of the 
lessee as being an amount received by him as a premium or 
like consideration in respect of a grant of the right to ust- 
the premises. The Court, however, held that the amount 
received for the surrender of a right of occupation could 
not be taxable as such in as much as the payment was not in
Pagt? 4 6 .
respect of occupation by a lessee but the cessation of such 
occupation. The amount was accordingly not subject to tax.
The above cases are clearly all in accordance with the 
general principles governing the tax treatment of the 
receipt of compensation or damages, in that compensation for 
the loss of rental is clearly designed to fill a hole in 
income and not in capital.
Analogous to compensation received in respect of the loss of 
an asset or contractual right, are payments received as 
compensation for restraints of trade. Several cases of this 
type merit consideration. In ITC 254 (7 SATC 56) the 
taxpayer had a business which consisted of two branches, 
namely a manufacturing and a sales branch. The taxpayer 
entered into an agreement with a competitor in terras of 
which the manufacturing branch was closed down in conside­
ration for a monthly payment of £60,00. The agreement was 
for an initial period of 2 years and thereafter for an 
indefinite period, subject to cancellation on 6 month’s 
notice by either party. The taxpayer maintained that the 
payments which it received were capital amounts, with which 
contention the Court agreed in the following terms (at page 
57) :
"It seems clear to the Court that the transaction in
effect was one which constituted this money a receipt
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of a capital nature. The appellants were not earning 
their income in the Way in which they had previously 
done, and in effect, they ceased to earn income from 
this particular business in the normal way. It does 
not appear to the Court that this was portion of a 
scheme of profit-making, which they had adopted, but 
rather that they surrendered a scheme of profit making 
which had been in vogue in consideration of a certain 
payment."
The Court found support for its decision in the Glenboig 
case. It should be noted that although the taxpayer was in 
receipt of a monthly payment, it was nevertheless held to be 
a capital amount. This aspect will be discussed further.
Within this category of payment also fall the so-called "oil 
company" cases. For instance, in ITC 772 (19 SATC 301) the 
taxpayer conducted the business of a garage and service 
station. In the particular year of assessment in question, 
it had received an amount of £1500,00 from an oil company 
pursuant to an agreement with the company in terms of which 
the taxpayer agreed to purchase from the oil company all the 
petrol and lubricants required for the purposes of its 
garage and service station business and to display and 
expose for sale only the products of the oil company in 
question. The agreement also provided that should the 
taxpayer wish to sell or lease the premises the oil company
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would have a right of pre-emption in those respects. The 
agreement was for a period of 5 years with a right of 
renewal for two further periods of 5 years each. The Court 
held that the true effect of the contract was to restrict 
the taxpayer's previously unfettered right to trade. This, 
held the Court, constituted part of the taxpayer's machinery 
for producing income or profit-making apparatus. .Even 
although the agreement was for a temporary period, for that 
period there was a sterilisation of a portion of the 
taxpayer's capital assets. The payment was accordingly 
capital in nature. A similar result is to be found in the 
Australian case of Dickenson v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (7 AXTR 257)* This case was also one where the 
taxpayer had a garage and. service station business and 
agreed with Shell to deal only in Shell products. It was 
also agreed that the taxpayer would not, for a period of 5 
years, within a radius of 5 miles from his existing service 
station become interested in a service station other than 
one in which Shell products, were exclusively sold. Compen­
sation was paid by Shell to the taxpayer. The Court adopted 
the same line of reasoning as that applied in 1TC 772, 
stating (at page 267):
"It appears to me that the sum or sums were paid as the 
quid pro quo for an effective tie of the appellant's 
business to one wholesale vendor of petrol. The 
appellant's business constituted a profit yielding
organisation of a different structure under his control 
and he received the money as part of an inducement to 
change a feature in it. ... there is nothing recurrent 
in the nature of the payment. It is not a normal or 
natural incident of carrying on such a business and it 
does not represent a purpose for which such a business 
is carried on. I think therefore that the sum ought 
not to be treated as a profit of the existing 
business.
The compensation payments were therefore held to be of a 
capital nature.
The English Courts have adopted the same approach in dealing 
with payments in restraint of trade. As an example of this 
the case of Margerison (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Tyresoles 
Limited (25 TC 59) may be cited* In this case the 
respondent company carried on the business of "tyresoling" 
which was a process for renovating old tyres. It entered 
into agreements with various motor traders in terms of which 
it erected and operated a tyresoling plant at the premises 
of the motor traders in return for a monthly payment. The 
company also agreed not to situate another tyresoling plant 
or canvass for orders within certain prescribed areas in 
relation to each trader with which it had a contract, in 
return for which it received a lump sum payment on 
commencement of the agreement* The Court held that the
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restraint imposed on the company was a parting by the 
company of a portion of its capital resources and as such 
the lump sum payment received was capital*
That concludes the analysis of the major categories of 
receipts or accruals of compensation and damages and it 
remains only to discuss briefly certain miscellaneous cases 
which do not fit neatly into the above broad categories.
The first of these cases is ITC 899 (23 SATC 497) where the 
facts were that the appellant had sold his farms together 
with implements and other movables to a particular 
purchaser. The purchaser was unable to meet the obligations 
in terms of the contract and after some negotiation the sale 
was cancelled. Compensation was paid to the seller under 
three headings, namely depreciation on implements, capital 
reduction and interest on the sale price. The first two 
items were held by the Court to be receipts of a capital 
nature whereas the amount received in respect of interest 
was held to constitute a receipt on income account.
ITC 880 (23 SATC 234) dealt with a case where a lender 
permitted the early repayment of a loan in return for th& 
payment of £1500,00 as consideration therefor* The Court 
found that this amount took the place and the colour of the 
interest lost and accordingly formed portion of the tax-* 
payer's income. This case is analogous to the cases where 
compensation is paid to a lessor for the early termination
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of a lease, such compensation being regarded as amounts in 
lieu of future rentals. In ITC 880 the amount paid was 
regarded as being in place of fnture interest.
A somewhat unusual case is that of Miller v CIR (18 SATC 
347; 1952 (4) SA 765 T) where the appellant taxpayer had 
been a partner with two other persons in certain interests. 
The partnership was dissolved and a certain Mr Horwitz 
agreed to procure the release of his former partners from 
certain obligations which they had undertaken. Being unable 
to procure their release witJn the period stipulated, it 
was agreed that, Horwitz would pay to his former partners 
(one of whom was, of course, the taxpayer) a certain monthly 
sum until such time as the releases were effected. The 
amounts received from Horwitz by the taxpayer were subjected 
to tax and he appealed to the Transvaal Provincial Division 
against this assessment. The Court held that the penalty 
payments in question "bore the imprint of income” and were 
not of a capital nature. This case is unusual in that the 
amounts paid to the taxpayer were not in respect of any loss 
which the taxpayer had actually suffered but constituted a 
penalty for the late fulfilment of certain obligations. The 
decision of the Court is no doubt correct as it cannot be 
said that the taxpayer's income-producing machine had in any 
way been affected-
The final case to discuss in this section of miscellaneous 
cases is ITC 7 23 (17 SATC 496) where the taxpayer entered 
into an agreement with a builder and certain associates to 
take over an option to take up shares in a landowning 
company with a view to developing the land and sharing the 
profits. The taxpayer was actually a wholesale merchant.
The builder failed to transfer the option to the company and 
an action for damages was brought by the taxpayer and the 
associates, which action was settled, the taxpayer even­
tually receiving the sum of £1000,00* The balance of this 
amount, after allowing for certain expenditure, was included 
by the Commissioner in the taxpayer's income. The Court 
found that the amount in question was income on the basis 
that the transaction out of which the claim for damages 
arose was a transaction entered into for the purpose of a 
profit making scheme and would have resulted in income and 
not in a capital gain or loss. The damages were therefore 
paid in respect of loss of income and not loss of capital. 
The result is, it is respectfully submitted, correct and in 
accordance with the general principles applicable to 
receipts of payments of damages*
It remains only to discuss the question, which has been 
touched on briefly from time to time above, whether the 
manner of calculating Compensation or damages to be paid in 
any way affects whether the amount arrived at is income or 
capital? in other words, does the fact that damages ate
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calculated with relation to profits necessarily result in 
the amount arrived at being of a revenue nature? It is also 
proposed to discuss briefly whether the fact that a payment 
is a lump sum payment or paid in several instalments in any 
way affects the .issue.
One may begin by referring once again to the leading case of 
Glenboig where it was Said (op. cit. at 409):
"It is, no doubt, true that the. measure by which the 
amount of compensation is fixed may be, and in the Case 
we are now dealing with was held by the learned arbiter 
to be the profits which the railway company prevented 
the appellant's from making by the appellants being 
prohibited from working the reserved minerals. That, 
in my opinion, is beside the real question"* And again 
at page 412; "True the appellant's Counsel pointed out 
that the sum was awarded by the learned arbiter as 
being equivalent to his estimate of the capitalised 
amount of profits of which, by the embargo, they were 
deprived. Ergo, it was contended, that the sum is for 
loss of profits, and is not of the nature of capital*
In this argument, there is, I think, a double fallacy."
The true test, the Court stated, was to determine what the 
amount was really paid for and from what it arose, tfhis was 
reaffirmed in the Burroah Steamship Company case (op. cit. at
page 160). See also Barr, Crombie and Co Limited (op. cit 
at page 410) where it was stated that:
"Although annual payments in the nature of profits may 
be used as the measure by which to calculate the sum 
which is to be paid, the resultant sum is not thereby 
made itself an annual payment or a profit."
It will be noted that in all of the above three quoted 
cases, although the compensation in question was calculated 
with reference to profits or remuneration, the sum was found 
to be in each case of a capital nature.
The same principle exists in South African law as is clear 
from the case of ITC 1341 (op. cit) where it is held that 
although there was a close relationship between the agreed 
compensation and the loss of profits which flowed from the 
termination of the agreement, not too much significance 
should be accorded to that Since the use of expected profits 
to value a capital asset is a normal principle of valuation*
To turn now to the method of payment, it is clear that the 
mere fact that compensation or damages is paid as a lump sum 
does not necessarily constitute that amount capital* See 
for instance ITC 6 (op. cit) where a lump sum payment was 
held to be income. Reference was made to the case of
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Hancock v General Reversionary and Investment Company 
Limited (7 TC 358) where it was said:
1 It seems to me to be as impossible to hold that the 
fact that a lump sum was paid instead of a recurring 
series of annual payments alters the character of the 
expenditure as it would be to hold that if an employer 
made a voluntary arrangement with his servant to pay 
the servant two years' salary in advance instead of 
paying each year's salary as it fell due/ he would be 
making a capital outlay.”
Similarly in ITC 312 (op, cit) the lump sum payment made in 
respect of the cancellation of the lease was found to be of 
a revenue nature. As was stated in the Tyresoles Limited 
case (op. cit at page 36):
"There is no magic here in the distinction between a 
lump sum and a periodical sum. T?he question is: what 
is the nature of the sum? And although the fact that 
there i*7 a lump sum paid once and for all rather tends 
to colour the question and to make one inclined to 
regard it as of a capital nature, that, in my opiniont 
is apt to be misleading."
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it is clear therefore that a lump sum may be income.
Hancock v General Reversionary and Investment Company
ijimited (7 TG. 35ft) where it was said:
"11 seems to me to be as impossible to hold that the 
iract that a lump sum was paid instead of a recurring 
aeries of annual payments alters the character of the 
expenditure as it would be to hold that if an employer 
made a voluntary arrangement with his servant to pay 
the servant two years' salary in advance instead of 
paying each year's salary as it fell due, he would be 
making a capital outlay,"
similarly in ITC 312 (op* cit) the lump sum payment made in. 
respect of the cancellation of the lease was found to be of 
- revenue nature. As was stated, in the Tyresoles Limited
(op. sit at page 36) s
"There in- no magic here in the distinction between a. 
Lump sum and a periodical Sum. The question is: what 
it tht* nature o£ the sum? And although the fact t l .at 
therti is a lump sum paid once and for all rather tends 
to colour the question and to make one inclined to 
regard it as of a capital nature, that, in my opinion, 
if apt to be misleading."
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it jb ear therefore that « lump sum m^y be income.
On the other hand, is it possible to regard a periodical sura 
as capital? This question was answered in the affirmative 
in ITC 463 (op. cit) where a monthly payment for 10 years 
was held nevertheless to be a capital amount. Reference was 
made by the Court to the English case of Jones v Commis­
sioner of I1-land Revenue (121 LT 611) which was approved in 
Deary v Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue (19 20 CPD 541) 
where it was said:
"A man may sell his property for a sum which is to be 
paid by instalments, and when you see that that is the 
case, that is not income nor any part of it ... A mat 
may sell his property for what is an annuity - that is 
to say he causes the principal to disappear and an 
annuity to take its place. If you can see that that is 
what it is, then the Income Tax Act taxes it, Or a man 
may sell his property for what looks like an annuity, 
but you can see quite well from the transaction that it 
is not really the transmutation of a principal sum into 
an annuity, but it is a principal sum, the payment of 
which is being spread over a time and is being paid 
with interest, and it is all being calculated in a way 
familiar to accountants and actuaries, although taking 
the form only of an annuity ». when you break up the. 
sum and decide what it really was."
A similar result was obtained in JTC 254 (op. cit) where 
periodical payments in restraint of trade were found to be 
capital, Silke, (op. cit page 83, Note 36) seems to express 
some doubt as to the correctness of this case and queries 
whether the form of the consideration should not perhaps 
have altered the result. It should, of course, be noted 
that paragraph (a) of the definition of gross income in 
Section 1 of the Act includes in gross income "any amount 
received or accrued by way of an annuity"* The term 
"annuity" is not defined in tne Act although there are 
numerous cases which have attempted such a task. In ITC 761 
(19 SATC 103) the main characteristics of an annuity were 
said to be that it is an annual payment? that it is 
repetitive and that it is chargeable against some person.
The Appellate Division has had the following to say:
"Used in regard to payments, the word ("Annuity"), from 
its very nature, postulates the element of recurrence, 
in the sense of annual payments (even if made, say, 
quarterly during the year) and this element of 
necessary annual recurrence cannot be present unless 
the beneficiary has a right to receive more than one 
annual payment." - -P v Watermeyer (1965 (4) SA 431 
A; 27 SATC 117) .
Xt is submitted however that the remarks quoted above from 
Jones' case nevertheless remain Valid, if an amount paid in
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periodical instalments is nothing more than an instalment of 
a principal capital sum, then the mere fact that it is made 
on an instalment basis should not necessarily convert the 
amount into an annuity or otherwise render it liable to tax. 
See also ITC 115 (4 SATC 66). In general see Silke, (op. 
cit, paragraph 4.3).
Finally, it should be noted that the receipt of an amount by 
way of damages or compensation may represent a recoupment of 
previously deducted expenditures or capital allowances and 
therefore fall to be included as income in terms of Section 
8 (4) of the Act.
In conclusion of this chapter therefore, it may be said that 
where an amount is received by way of compensation or 
damages in respect of the loss or sterilisation or a capital 
asset or the loss or destruction, whether of the whole of or 
of a substantial part of, the: income-producing machine of 
the taxpayer's business, the amount will be capital. In 
other cases the amount will be regarded as income. Although 
different terminology and varying tests have been applied in 
the different categories of cases which have been analysed 
above, it is submitted that the general principle remains 
the same throughout.
Page 59.
Page 60.
Chapter 3 - The deductibility of damages and compensation 
paid
In chapter 2 the taxability of damages or compensation 
received or accrued has been examined and it is now rteces- 
sary to consider the other side of the coin, namely whether 
the payer of damages or compensation to another person may 
deduct the amounts so paid from his income. The Courts have 
enunciated certain tests in attempting to answer this 
question and it will be seen that the approach has not been 
altogether consistent. In an attempt to analyse the various 
decisions, it is proposed to follow a basis of analysis 
broadly similar to that adopted in chapter 2, namely the 
division of cases into general categories so that cases of a. 
similar general nature may be compared. It is hoped that by 
analysing the cases on this basis, a test applicable to 
cases of a similar nature may be discovered.
The deductibility of all items is governed by Section 11 of 
the Act as read with Section 23. In particular Section 
11(a) states that:
"There shall be allowed as deductions from the income 
of a person 'expenditure and losses actually incurred 
in the Republic in the production of the income,
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provided such expenditure and losses are not of a ; :
■ 1 .
: ' i’1
capital nature^." :
j' ■ j |
Together with Section 11 must be read Secticn 23, and in j >
particular Section 23(g) where it is provided that no
deductions shall be made in respect of "any monies claimed ;
as a deduction from income derived from trade, which are not ;
) ' ' ' ^I " 1 '
only or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of i
trade," ii , ■ . ;
i.n ? i
• ] '" ■ 1 ■ 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to analyse 
all the constituent elements of these two Sections, except ;
insofar as they may be appropriate to the determination of :. ,
the question of the deductibility of damages or compensation , ,
paid, but certain introductory remarks on the general ;
interpretation of these Sections may be apposite.
The distinction between the words "expenditure" and "losses" ; ;
as they occur in Section 11(a) has been highlighted and in <
Joffe & Co vs CIR (1946 AD 157, 13 SATC 354) Watermeyer, !
C.J. at page 360 of the judgment in the SATC reports said in j
regard to the word "losses";
< »
; ■ i
. , w  |
"In relation to trading operations the word is \
[ . 3
sometimes used to signify a deprivation suffered by the ! :
f
loser, usually an involuntary deprivation, whereas ■
:3f
' . ' ' Sl 
■ — » ... lfTII, .-j ..... * r— • m '‘wu'Tfr
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expenditure usually means a voluntary payment of 
money."
Furthermore, provided an expense has been actually incurred, 
in the sense that a liability to make payment has arisen, 
such an expense is deductible (see Port Elizabeth Electric 
Tramway Co. Limited vs CIR - 1936 CPD 241,8 SATC 13). It 
should also be noted that the expenditure or losses must be 
actually incurred in the Republic of South Africa. Possibly 
the major1 distinguishing test for the deduction of expendi­
ture and losses is that they must have been incurred "in the 
production of the income" and furthermore the monies must 
have been "wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for 
the purposes of trade''. These words will be examined in 
some detail in analysing the various cases applicable to the 
payment of compenpation and damages and accordingly it is 
not proposed to deal with them at this stage.
Finally, in order to rank as a deduction an expenditure or 
loss must not be of a capital nature. Again these words 
have enjoyed some attention in the cases relating to damages 
and compensation but it is appropriate to state at this 
stage the oft cited test on the distinction between capital 
and revenue expenditure and losses enunciated by Watermeyer, 
C.Ji in. the case of New fiat ate. Areas Limited vs CIR (1946 AD 
610, 14 SATC 155)* At page 184 of the SATC reports the 
Chief Justice stated that expenditure or losses may be
incurred in the actual operations or work of a business or 
alternatively in the acquisition or improvement of the means 
of production. He then went on to say:
"Both these forms of expenditure can be described as 
expenditure in the production of the income but the 
former is, as a rule, current or revenue expend’ture, 
and the latter is, as a rule, expenditure of a-capital 
nature. As to the latter the distinction must be 
remembered between floating or circulating and fixed 
capital. ... The expenditure of a capital natures the 
deduction of which is prohibited under Section 11(2) 
(now Section. 11(a)), is expenditure of a fixed capital 
nature, not expenditure of a floating capital nature, 
because expenditure which constitutes the use of 
floating capital for the purposes of earning a profit, 
such as the purchase price of stock-in-trade, must 
necessarily be deducted from the proceeds of the sale 
of stock-in-trade in order to arrive at the taxable 
income derived by the taxpayer from that trade. The 
problem which arises when deductions are claimed is 
therefore usually whether the expenditure in question 
should properly be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing the income-earning operations or as part of 
the cost of establishing or improving or adding to the 
income-earning plant or machinery ... The conclusion 
to be drawn from all of these cases seems to be that
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the true nature of each transaction must be inquired 
into in order to determine whether the expenditure 
attached to it is capital or revenue expenditure. Its 
true nature is a matter of fact and the purpose of the 
expenditure is an important factor; if it is incurred 
for the purpose of acquiring a capital asset for the 
business it is capital expenditure even if it is paid 
in annual instalments; if, on the other hand it is in 
truth no more than part of the cost incidental to the 
performance of the income-producing operations, as 
distinguished from the equipment of the income-produ­
cing machine, then it is revenue expenditure even if it 
is paid in a lump sum.”
A further test which has been frequently cited is that laid 
down by Innes, C.J. in ClR ys George Forest Timber Co 
Limited (1924 AD 516, 1 SATC 20). At pages 526 to 527 of 
the Appellate Division report, it was said:
"Now, money spent in creating or acquiring an income- 
producing concern must be capital expenditure. It is 
invested to yield future profits; and while the outlay 
does not recur the income does. There is a great 
difference between money spent in creating or acquiring 
a source of profit, and money spent in working it. The 
one is capital expenditure, the other is not. .4. The 
reason is plain; in the one case it is spent to enable
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the true nature of each transaction must be inquired 
into in order to determine whether the expenditure 
attached to it is capital or revenue expenditure. Its 
true nature is a matter of fact and the purpose of the 
expenditure is an important factor; if it is incurred 
for the purpose of acquiring a capital asset for the 
business it is capital expenditure even if it is paid 
in annual instalments? if, on the other hand it is in 
truth no more than part of the cost incidental to the 
performance of the income-producing operations, as 
distinguished from the equipment of the income-produ­
cing machine, then it is revenue expenditure even if it 
is paid in a lump sum."
A further test which has been frequently cited is that laid 
down by Innes, C.J* in CIR Vs George Forest timber Co 
Limited (1924 AD 516, 1 SATC 20). At pages 526 to 527 Of 
the Appellate Division report, it was said;
"Now, money spent in creating or acquiring an income- 
producing concern must be capital expenditure* It is 
invested to yield future profits? and while the outlay 
does not recur the income does. There is a great 
difference between money spent in creating or acquiring 
a source of profit, and money spent in working it* The 
one is capital expenditure, the other is not* ■. *. The 
reason is plain? in the one case it is Spent to enable
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the concern to yield profits in the future, in the 
other it is spent in working the concern for the 
present production of profit. The definition is 
statutory; but is recognises the basis distinction 
between the two classes of outgoings."
The distinction between expenditure of a capital or a 
revenue nature has been pertinently considered by the Court 
in several cases dealing with the payment of compensation 
and damages. In ITC 727 {18 SATC 91) the taxpayer Was a 
partner in a firm of consulting engineers. In the year of 
assessment in question, the taxpayer claimed a deduction of 
£300 in respect of an item headed "compensation for error". 
It was held by the Special Court that the firm had been 
under no obligation to make the payment, which had arisen 
when the boundaries of a lot were not observed in the 
construction of certain buildings as a result of which some 
foundations had to be demolished and rebuilt. The Court 
found that it could not say that there was any liability on 
the firm of engineers to make the payment and that it had, 
in fact, been motivated by a desire to preserve its good 
name and the payment had therefore been made ex gratia.
This the Court said/ was "clearly an outlay of a, capital 
nature" and was therefore not deductible.
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Other cases dealing with the question of the deductibility
of compensation and damages paid which have revolved around
the concern to yield profits in the future, in the 
other it is spent in working the concern for the 
present production of profit. The definition is 
statutory; but is recognises the basis distinction 
between the two classes of outgoings.M
The distinction between expenditure of a capital or a 
revenue nature has been pertinently considered by the Court 
in several cases dealing with the payment of compensation 
and damages. In ITC 727 (18 SATC 91) the taxpayer was a 
partner in a firm of consulting engineers. In the year of 
assessment in question, the taxpayer claimed a deduction of 
£300 in respect of an item headed "compensation for error". 
It was held by the Special Court that the firm had been 
under no obligation to make the payment, which had arisen 
when the boundaries of a lot were not observed in the 
construction of certain buildings as a result of which some 
foundations had to be demolished and rebuilt* The Court 
found that it could not say that there was any liability on 
the firm of engineers to make the payment and that it had, 
in fact* been motivated by a desire to preserve its good 
name and the payment had therefore been made ex gratia,
This the Court said, was ’clearly an outlay of a capital 
nature” and was therefore not deductible.
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Other cases dealing with the question of the deductibility
of compensation and damages paid which have revolved around
thtj question of capital and revenue are, inter alia, ITC 
1.267 (39 SATC 146) and ITC 1076 (28 SATC 31) . A similar 
approach or the revenue and capital question can be 
discerned ixt the attitude of the English Courts (in this 
respect see Morgan vs Tate and Lyle Limited ((1954) 2 AER 
413). The facts of these cases will be dealt with later.
Thus rar the general elements for the deductibility of all 
expenses and losses have been dealt with; it is now 
possible to deal specifically with the question of the 
deductibility of damages and compensation paid. As 
previously stated it is proposed, to do this by categorising 
the cases under general headings and examining the approach 
adopted in each such category. The first category to be 
dealt with are those cases in which damages were paid as a 
sfesult of delictual or tortious liability. This is by far 
the single largest category of cases and furthermore 
contains the leading eases on this particular subject.
The leading case, not only in the field of the deduction of 
compensation and damages, but also in regard to the 
deductibility of expenditure or losses as a whole, is 
undoubtedly the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Company 
Limibed case (supra)» The facts of this case are simply 
statedv A driver of one of the company's trams lost control 
of his vehicle and collided with a building, injuring 
himself. Compensation was claimed under the Workmen's
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Compensation Act and after legal proceedings, the company 
was ordered to pay an amount of damages. Costs in resisting 
the legal proceedings Were also incurred. The question then 
arose whether the company was entitled to deduct the damages 
it had paid as well as the legal costs it had incurred from 
its income and the question eventually fell for decision 
before the Cape Provincial Division. At page 244 of the 
judgment the Court said that there are three qualifications 
for expenditure to be allowable as a deduction, namely the 
expenditure must be actually incurred/ it must not be of a 
capital nature and it must be incurred in the production of 
income. Furthermore as long as it is "actually" incurred it 
need not have been incurred "necessarily". The Court had 
little difficulty with the first two qualifications in this 
case finding that clearly the expenditure had actually been 
incurred and that it was not of a capital nature insofar as 
its purpose "was not that of acquiring an income-producing 
concern” and that the expenditure could possibly be 
recurrent.
The Court then turned to the third qualification namely, was 
the expenditure incurred in the production of income and 
furthermore was it wholly and exclusively made for the 
purposes of trade. The Court then analysed various 
decisions in the course o£ which the following test was laid 
down at pages 245 and following;
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"Now, as pointed out above, income is produced by the 
performance of a series of acts and attendant upon them 
are expenses * Such expenses are deductible expenses 
provided they are so closely linked to such acts as to 
be regarded as part of the cost of performing them.
... A little reflection will show that two questions 
arise (a) whether the act to which the expenditure is 
attached is performed in the production of income and 
(b) whether the expenditure is linked to it closely 
enough. Though at first sight it would appear that 
only acts necessary to earn the income and expenditure 
necessarily attendant upon such acts should be 
deducted; but this is not so.
As pointed out above businesses are conducted by 
different persons in different ways. The purpose of 
the act entailing expenditure must be looked to. If it 
is performed for the purpose of earning income then the 
expenditure attendant upon it is deductible. It
follows that provided the act is bona fide done for a 
purpose of carrying on the trade which earns the income 
the expenditure attendant on it is deductible. It 
seems, however, that this statement may require 
qualification in one respect. If the act done is 
unlawful or negligent and the attendant expense is 
occasioned by the unlawfulness or possibly the
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negligence of the act then probably it would not be 
deductible ...
The other question is what attendant expenses can be 
deducted? How closely roust they be linked to the 
business operation? Here, in my opinion, all expenses 
attached to the performance of a business operation 
bona fide performed for the purpose of earning income 
are deductible whether such expenses are necessary for 
its performance or attached to it by chance or are bona 
fide incurred for a more efficient performance of such 
operation provided they are so closely connected with 
it that they may be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing it.” (My underlining).
Turning to the facts, the Court then applied the test it had 
just stated and found that the employment of drivers Was 
necessary for the business of the Tramway Company and that 
such employment carried with it as a necessary consequence a 
potential liability for compensation if the drivers were 
injured in the course of their employment. The liability 
was inseparable from the employment of drivers and 
accordingly, the Court found, the damages which had been 
paid Were deductible. The question of the deduction of the 
legal costs however, the Court found was to be dealt with on 
a different footing and were in fact not deductible. The 
reason for this was that "in the present case they were
expended in resisting a demand for compensation, this is not 
an operation entered upon for the purpose of earning income" 
(page 248) .
The test laid down can be summarised as follows:
Expenditure attendant upon an act bona fide done for the 
purpose of carrying on a trade which earns the income is 
deductible provided that the expenditure is so closely 
connected with the act that it may be regarded as part of 
the cost of performing it.
The Court also appeared to suggest that unlawful or 
negligent acts would render any expenditure connected with 
those acts non-deductible. This view has however been 
challenged and in ITC 815 (20 SATC 487 at 491) it was said:
"Negligence in itself affords no reason why a loss 
caused by it should be held to be non-deductible, And 
there is no reason in principle why it should make any 
difference whether the negligence is that of employees 
or of the taxpayer himself * Negligence is an element 
of inefficiency, and an inefficient taxpayer is taxed 
upon the income which he actually earns and not upon 
that which he should have earned had he been efficient. 
Whether or not a loss caused by negligence would be 
deductible would depend upon the facts of the 
particular case and upon such matters as the nature and
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degree of the negligence and the character of the
business."
It is submitted that this is the correct approach and that 
there is no reason why the test as set out in the Port 
Elizabeth Tramway's case cannot be applied equally validly 
to negligent acts as to any others. The approach of the 
Courts on this question has not been consistent but 
apparently the practice of the Revenue Authorities is to 
allow the deduction of expenditure incurred as a result of 
the negligence of the taxpayer or his employees if accidents 
are a necessary result of the operations of the taxpayer 
(see Silke, op. cit*, paragraph 7.27)*
A similar case to the Port Elizabeth Tramway's case and 
which predated it, was ITC 8 (1 SATC 57) where the taxpayer, 
also a tramway company, had paid compensation for injuries 
to per >ons and damages to property resulting from 
collisions, broken trolley wires and excavations in roadways 
and from accidents due to passengers alighting while the 
trams were still in motion. Legal expenses had also been 
incurred. The Court adopted similar reasoning to that which 
would be applied in the Port Elizabeth Tramway's case and 
said that the expenditure had to an extent been "inevit­
able" . At page 58 the Court referred to the various items 
of expenditure and saidi
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"The occurrences they represent were not extraordinary 
or abnormal. They were incidental and pursuant to the 
course of the operations which produced the profits and 
formed a necessary risk, undertaken to earn the profits. 
Such being the case they were losses incurred on income 
account *"
Adopting a different approach to that adopted in the Port 
Elizabeth Tramway's case however, in this case the Court 
found that the legal expenditure was equally inevitable and 
was also deductible.
mother leading case in this field is Joffe1s case (supra) 
which was a decision of the Appellate Division. The facts 
in this case were that the taxpayer was an engineering firm 
which had contracted to carry out the steel reinforcement 
necessary for a cantilever hood* The reinforcing steel rods 
for the support of the hood had been displaced from their 
proper position during the operations of pouring concrete 
and as a result of this displacement, the structure was 
weakened and collapsed, killing a plumber who was working 
beneath it at the time. Action was instituted against the 
taxpayer on behalf of the dependants of the plumber and it 
was found that the taxpayer had been negligent as it should 
have taken proper precautions to ensure that the steel rods 
were not displaced and damages were awarded in favour of the 
plumber's dependants. Legal costs were also incurred by the
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taxpayer in defending the action and it was further required 
to pay the costs of the successful litigants. The taxpayer 
sought to deduct the damages and the costs.
The judgment of the Appellate Division was delivered by 
Watermeyer, C.J. (who, co-incidentally had been the judge to 
deliver the decision in the Port Elizabeth Tramway's case). 
After stating the statutory provisions applicable, the Court 
went on as follows:
"All expenditure, therefore, necessarily attached to 
the performance of the operations which constitute the 
carrying on of the income-earning trade, would be 
deductible and also all expenditure which, though not 
attached to the trading operations of necessity, is yet 
bona fide incurred for the purpose of carrying them on, 
provided such payments are wholly and exclusively made 
for that purpose and l x g not expenditure of a capital 
nature.
The damages paid out in this case do not pass that 
test. They were paid out to discharge a debt or legal 
liability to the plumber's dependants, arising out of 
the Appellant's negligence in performing a trading 
operation. There is nothing in the stated case to 
suggest that such negligence, and the consequent 
liability which such negligence entailed, were
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necessary concomitants of the trading operations of a 
reinforced concrete engineer? nor was it shown that 
the liability was incurred bona fide for the purpose of 
carrying on any trading operation. Consequently, 
according to the interpretation which I have suggested 
above, the payment of the damages was not made for the 
purposes of trade."
The Court then went on to analyse the meaning of the word 
“loss" but found, in any -event., that for the same reasons as 
have been quoted above, even if the damages were regarded as 
a "loss" they were not deductible. It had been conceded by 
counsel that if the deductibility of the damages was not 
allowed, then the costs would also not be deductible. The 
taxpayer accordingly failed in all respects.
It is submitted that the decision in Jof fe1s case is some­
what difficult to reconcile with that in the Port Elizabeth 
Tramway1 s1 case as although it is no doubt correct to say 
that negligence is not a "necessary concomitant" of the 
business of an engineer, negligence in such a context is not 
totally unheard of and furthermore the act or omission 
giving rise to the claim for damages was undoubtedly incur*- 
red in the course of the taxpayer's income-earning opera­
tions and was a result of those operations. It is respect­
fully suggested that the Court applied an unnecessarily 
strict approach.
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In both the Port Elizabeth Tramway and the Joffe cases, 
substantial reliance was placed on English authorities. The 
leading English case of Usher's Wiltshire Brewery vs Bruce 
(1915 AC 433) was relied upon. In this case the deduction 
of certain expenditure, which had been incurred in respect 
of certain tied houses in order to improve the trade of a 
brewery company, was allowed as the expenses were incurred 
wholly for the purposes of trade.
Reliance was also placed upon the House of Lords decision in 
Strong and Company vs Woodifield (Surveyor of Taxes) (1906 
AC 4 48, 5 TC 215) . This Case also concerned a brewery 
company which owned an inn. A customer sleeping in the inn 
was injured by a chimney which fell upon him and the brewery 
company was compelled to pay damages and costs resulting 
from the fall of the chimney as it was found that that was 
due to the negligence of its servants who had failed to see 
that the premises were ir proper repair * At pages 215 of the 
Tax Cases report the following famous test, which has been 
frequently referred to in subsequent English, South African 
and various Commonwealth decisions, was laid down by the 
Lord Chancellor:
"in my opinion, however, it does not follow that if a 
loss is in any sense connected with a trade, it must 
always be allowed as a deduction; for it may be only 
remotely connected with the trade or it may be
connected with something else quite as much as or even 
more than with a trade. X think only such losses can 
be deducted as are connected with it in the sense that 
they are really incidental to the trade itself. They 
cannot be deducted if they are mainly incidental to 
some other vocation, or fall on the trader in some 
character other than that of a trader. The nature of 
the trade is to be considered. To give an 
illustration, losses sustained by a railway company in 
compensating passengers for accidents in travelling 
might be deducted. On the other hand, if a man kept a 
grocer's shop, for keeping which a house is necessary, 
and one of the window shutters fell upon and injured a 
man walking in the street; the loss arising thereby to 
the grocer ought not to be deducted. Many cases might 
be put near the line, and no degree of ingenuity can 
frame a formula so precise and comprehensive as to 
solve at sight all the cases that may arise. In the 
present Case, I think that the loss sustained by the 
Appellants was not really incidental to their trade as 
innkeepers, and fell upon them in their character not 
of traders but of householders."
The test adopted here was that an expenditure or loss would 
be deductible if it was "incidental" to the trade, bearing 
in mind the nature of the trade* The difficulty, as the
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Lord Chancellor so correctly points out, is in applying the 
test to the facts of each case.
The approach adopted by the Australian Courts in cases of 
this nature is illustrated in the case of The Herald and 
Weekly Times Limited vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2 
Australian Tax Decision 169). In this case the taxpayer, 
the publisher of an evening newspaper, sought to deduct 
payments which it had. made by way of compensation for claims 
for defamation, as well as costs recovered from it and its 
own legal costs * The Court reasoned as follows;
"None of the libels or supposed libels was published 
with any other object in view than the sale of the 
newspaper. The liability to damages was incurred, or 
the claim was encountered, because of the very act of 
publishing the newspaper, The thing which produced the 
assessable income was the thing which exposed the 
taxpayer to the liability or claim discharged by the 
expenditure. ... but this expenditure flows as a 
necessary or a natural consequence from the inclusion 
of the alleged defamatory matter in the newspaper and 
its publication* .4* The question whether money is 
expended in the production o£ assessable income cannot 
be determined by considering only the immediate reason 
for making a payment and ignoring the purpose with 
which the liability was incurred* ... The money was
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spent to answer the claims, and whether it was expended 
wholly and exclusively in the production of income, 
must depend upon the manner in which the claims were 
incurred, when it appears that the inclusion in the 
newspaper of matter alleged by claimants to be 
defamatory is a regular and almost unavoidable incident 
of publishing it, so that the claims directly flow from 
acts done for no other purpose than earning revenue, 
acts forming the essence of the business, no valid 
reason remains for denying that the money was wholly 
and exclusively expended in the production of 
assessable income." (Pages 171 - 172).
The Court accordingly held by three judges to two that the 
expenditure was deductible. It is submitted that the 
decision was correct.
Another case of interest, also involving the payment of 
amounts in respect of allegations of defamation, is that of 
G. Scammell and Nephew Limited vs Rowles ((1939) 1 AER 337). 
The somewhat complex facts of this case were that Mr Barrs, 
a shareholder and director of scammell's, acquired a 
controlling interest in another company known as Blv ; Belle 
Motors Limited. The existing shareholder and director of 
Blue Belle Motors, Mr Toms, was treated by the new board of 
the company as though he were no longer a director. Certain 
transactions then took place between Scammell and Blue
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Belle Motors resulting in certain amounts being owed by Blue 
Belle Motors to Scaitimell, which amounts were secured by the 
issue of debentures by Blue Belle Motors. Mr Toms then 
brought a minority action seeking certain relief, including 
the setting aside of various agreements between Scammell and 
Blue Belle Motors. A counter-action for slander was 
instituted by Mr Barrs and other directors against Mr Tome 
for certain allegations which he had made. The two action? 
were eventually compromised, various agreements were 
terminated but Blue Belle Motors agreed to pay certain 
amounts still outstanding and Scammell paid an amount to Mr 
Barrs of £7 500 in settlement of the slander action.
Scammell also paid certain amounts to Mr Toms in respect of 
costs he had incurred in the action and had itself incurred 
certain costs in preparing the deed of compromise.
Scammell sought to deduct these amounts. The Court found 
that the compromise was motivated by a desire on the part of 
Scammell to protect its trading interest, in that if Mr Toms 
had succeeded in his action the recovery of the trading 
debts owing to it by Blue Belle Motors would have been 
highly problematical. It was accordingly in order to secure 
its business position that Scammell had agreed to make tht; 
various payments concerned. '£he deduction of the. various 
amounts was therefore proper,
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Returning to the South African authorities on the question 
of the deductibility of damages and compensation/ the next 
case to he considered is that of Weinberg vs CIR (1946 CPD 
429, 14 SATC 210). The taxpayer in this case was the 
proprietor of a motor garage. The owner of a particular car 
paid for the garaging of the car, for having it dusted and 
polished and for the service of an employee of the garage 
calling at his house to take the car to the garage. The 
employee of the garage however, in using the car in an 
unauthorised manner for his own purposes, had an accident 
and damaged the car. As a result of this, damages and costs 
were awarded against the taxpayer which he then ‘sought to 
deduct from his income. The test enunciated in the Port 
Elizabeth Tramway's case was enunciated and it was said that 
before the taxpayer could deduct the sums in question it 
would have to be shown that the damaging of the car "was the 
inevitable or practically inevitable result of the contract 
which Appellant had with Oliver or of the business Appellant 
carried on" (page 436) . This was found net to be the case 
as the act was not performed in the production of income and 
the deduction was therefor disallowed. Similarly the 
deduction of the costs was disallowed.
*n ItC 233 (6 SATC 259) the facts were that a person was 
killed by cargo falling from a net attached to a crane while 
a vessel was being unloaded, the taxpayer being a stevedore. 
A dependant's action was instituted which was settled, the
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Appellants paying a capital sum and costs. The Appellants 
then sought to deduct these amounts and the Court, relying 
on the decision in Strong vs Woodifield held that the 
deduction was allowable. The Court found (at page 260) 
that:
"In the business of loading and unloading it is a very 
likely, and indeed almost foreseeable consequence, if 
not an inevitable consequence, that packages or other 
articles may fall out of nets handled by stevedores and 
injure passers-by, just as in the case of a building 
bricks or similar articles may fall from the building 
during the course of building operations and injure 
passers underneath".
The Court therefore found that the injury was an incidental 
of the business and that the deduction was permissible* 
(Broomberg, op. cit., page 205, is in error when he cites 
this case as an instance in which the deduction was not 
allowed).
On the other hand however, in ITC 30 (2 SATC 51) the cost of 
analysing a sheep dip which had been supplied by the 
taxpayer to certain of his customers and which h<aJ given 
rise to a claim for damages on the grounds that the sheep 
had been poisoned by the dip, was disallowed. The reason 
for disallowing the deduction was that "the analysis was
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undertaken solely in view of a claim for damages, and with a 
view to a possible settlement of the case, it was not an 
ordinary operation Undertaken for the purpose of the 
business." It is respectfully submitted that this case was 
not correctly decided in that the costs of analysis were 
sufficiently incidental to the business of supplying sheep 
dip to render such costs a proper deduction.
In ITC 83 (3 SATC 142) , a baker was sued for damages caused 
by excessive smoke emitted from the bakery chimney. Damages 
and costs were awarded against the baker (the taxpayer) 
which the taxpayer then sought to deduct. It was held, on 
the authority of Strong vs Woodifield that the loss had 
fallen upon the taxpayer as owner of the building rather 
than as baker and that the connection between the damages 
and the bakery business was too remote to justify the 
deduction*
A case in which damages were regarded as a capital loss was 
ITC 185 (5 SATC 273) . In this case, the taxpayer, who was a 
farmer, owned certain sheep dogs which had attacked and 
destroyed certain of his neighbour's sheep resulting in a 
payment of compensation by the taxpayer to his neighbour.
The Court held that the loss was not incurred in the 
production of the taxpayer's income and must be regarded as 
a capital loss*
Another case dealing with nuisance was ITC 191 (5 SATC 358) 
where the taxpayer carried on the business of manufacturing 
chemicals, in the course of which it discharged waste 
effluent onto certain land in its neighbourhood. Neighbours 
of the taxpayer complained and the local health authority 
required the company to abate the nuisance or close the 
factory. The company taxpayer then incurred costs in 
studying methods of disposing of the effluent without 
creating a nuisance. Furthermore, a flood occurred 
resulting in effluent being washed onto the lands of certain 
neighbouring agriculturalists and actions being instituted 
against the company. Further expenses were incurred by the 
company in obtaining expert evidence, inter alia, in dealing 
with this action. The company therefore sought to deduct 
the costs it had incurred in investigating the disposal of 
the effluent so as to comply with the requirements of the 
health board and also the expenditure relating to the action 
for damages* Both sets of expenditure were disallowed, the 
expenditure relating to the disposal of the effluent being 
found to be expenditure of a capital nature and that related 
to the action for damages as being insufficiently connected 
with the company's income-earning operations.
Another case which, it is submitted, was incorrectly decided 
was ITC 1058 (26 SATC 305) In this case the taxpayer was a 
manufacturer which had been held liable for damages arising 
out of a collision between a motor car driven by a third
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party and a railway trailer parked on a public road running 
past the factory of the taxpayer. The accident had occurred 
as the railways had delivered a load of raw materials to the 
taxpayer. The trailer, on which the goods were loaded, had 
been left in the road outside the taxpayer's premises. The 
goods had been off-loaded by servants of the taxpayer and 
the trailer had been moved further away from the entrance 
and left standing partly on the tarred portion of the road. 
The trailer was badly lit and during the night a car had 
collided with the rear of the trailer as a result of which 
damages were awarded against the taxpayer. The deduction of 
these damages which had been paid was disallowed by the 
Court, it being held that the case was quite different to 
that of the Port Elizabeth Tramway's case. In that case it 
was said (at page 310) that:
"The employment of drivers was necessary for carrying 
on the business of the company, and the employment of 
drivers carried with it, as a necessary consequence, a 
potential liability to pay compensation if such drivers 
were injured in the course of their employment. If 
that should not be done the company would not get 
drivers at all and the business would come to a halt.
It is money laid out wholly or exclusively for the 
purposes of trade. But the third party who happens to 
drive past the factory at night is not essential to the
Page 84.
Page 85.
Appellant's trade. Money laid out to compensate him is 
not for the purposes of trade,"
The Court's reasoning in this respect is, with respect, 
Unsatisfactory since the relevant act which gave rise to the 
payment of the damages claim was not the driving past the 
factory by the third party but the collision with the 
trailer. The trailer had been left on the roadway in the 
course of the taxpayer's business and it is submitted that 
the Court completely misconceived the correct application of 
the test and reached the wrong conclusion. Ironically, the 
Court allowed the deduction of the legal costs incurred by 
the taxpayer ii\ resisting the action for damages, finding 
that the deduction of the legal costs was permissible in 
terms of the then Section 11(2)(b) bis in that the costs had 
been incurred "by reason of the ordinary operations" of the 
taxpayer's trade. This Section has now been replaced by 
Section 11(c) in the present Act and will be dealt with 
later.
SIR vs Raubenheimer (1969 (4) SA 314 A, 31 SATC 209) the 
Respondent was a farmer. On his farm was a patch of weed 
which Raubenheimer was required by the Department of 
Agriculture to eradicate. Furthermore, Raubenheimer 
obtained a large portion of his income from cattle farming 
and the weed reduced the grazing value of the infested area 
and accordingly it was also in his interest to eradicate the
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weed. It was common practice to destroy the type of weed in 
question by burning and this was done by Raubenheimer on a 
day when he considered the weather favourable. However a 
strong wind sprang up and the fire went out of control 
causing serious damage to neighbouring farms and 
plantations. Actions for damages were instituted and 
eventually settled by Raubenheimer paying amounts in 
compensation to the various claimants. The deduction of the 
compensation paid was allowed by the Special Court in terms 
of Section 11(c), oddly enough, as being expenditure 
incurred in respect of a dispute or legal proceedings 
arising in the course of or by reason of the ordinary 
operations undertaken by the taxpayer in the carrying on of 
his trade. This was upheld by the Appellate Division,
Section 11(c) has since been amended to restrict its scope 
but it is believed that the decision in Raubenheimer1s case 
is instructive as to the general principles applicable in 
the deductibility Of damages and compensation paid.
A case already mentioned in the, discussion of deductions of 
a capital or revenue nature, is that of ITC 1076 (supra).
The taxpayer carried on the business of a manufacturer of 
motor springs and instituted an action for unfair 
competition against a competitor resulting out of certain 
advertisements published by, and other actions on the part 
of■, the competitor. The action was settled and the
competitor agreed to refrain for a period of six months from 
using advertisements relating to motor car suspension coil 
springs. The taxpayer sought to deduct the legal costs 
which it had incurred in the action thus far. The Court 
found that the intention of the action was to obtain 
recompense for the unlawful erosion of its profits and that 
if the taxpayer had recovered damages, those would have 
related to loss of profits and would have been taxable (page 
32). The Court therefore found as follows at page 33:
"In our view, therefore, the expenditure upon the 
litigation in the present case was incurred primarily 
to recover loss of income and as such it was part of 
the costs incidental to the performance of the 
income-producing operations, as distinguished from the 
equipment of the income-producing structure. If the 
litigation had been successful it might ultimately have 
had a beneficial effect upon the Appellant’s goodwill, 
but primarily it was embarked upon to recover past 
income, and as such was directly connected with the 
income-producing operations.'*
The expenditure was therefore, not of a capital nature and 
the deduction was allowed.
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Finally, before leaving the general heading of damages paid 
in respect of delictual liability, it should be noted that 
it is the current practice of the Department to allow the 
deduction of damages paid by hairdressers to customers who 
suffer* burns and electric shock and also compensation paid 
by laundry men for damage to or loss of customer's articles. 
(See Meyerowitz and Spiro, Income Tax in South Africa, 
paragraph 659).
It may be seen, therefore that in all the oases in this 
section, the approach has been to find, a link between the 
expenditure or loss in question and the income-producing 
operations of the taxpayer. The application of this test to 
the facts of each case has been done with varying degrees of 
success and it is submitted that the test set out in Port 
Elizabeth Tramway's case still constitutes the test to be 
applied in cases of this nature.
The doubt as to the deductibility of legal expenses, flowing 
in a large measure from the remarks of Watermeyer, A.J.p, in 
the Port Elizabeth Tramway's case were resolved by the 
inclusion of a specific Section in the Act permitting the 
deduction of such legal expenses. This deduction is now 
contained in Section 11(c) of the income Tax Act which 
permits the deduction of:
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"Any legal expenses (being fees for the services of 
legal practitioners, expenses incurred in procuring 
evidence or expert advice, Court fees, witness fees and 
expenses, taxing fees, the fees and expenses of 
Sheriffs or Messengers of Court and other expenses of 
litigation which are of an essentially similar nature 
to any of the said fees or expenses) actually incurred 
by the taxpayer during the year of assessment in 
respect of any claim, dispute or action at law arising 
in the course of or by reason of the ordinary 
operations undertaken by him in the carrying on of his 
trade: provided that the amount to be allowed under 
this paragraph in respect of any such expenses shall be 
limited to so much thereof as -
(i) is not of a capital nature; and
(ii) is not incurred in respect of any claim made 
against the taxpayer for the payment of 
damages or compensation if by reason of the 
nature of the claim or the circumstances any 
payment which is or might be made in 
satisfaction or settlement, of the claim does 
not or would not rank for deduction from his 
income under paragraph (a) or (b); and
(iii) is not incurred in respect of any claim made
by the taxpayer for the payment to him of any 
amount which does not or would not jonstitute 
income of the taxpayer? and
lir) is not incurred in respect of any dispute or
action at law relating to any such claim as 
is referred to in paragraph (ii) or (iii) of 
•xhis proviso,"
Proviso (ii) was clearly inserted to cater for the decision 
in Raubenheimer1s case and the decision in that case would 
appear to indicate that the scope of deductibility in terms 
of Section 11(c) is somewhat wider than that otherwise 
afforded in terms of Section 11(a) or 23(g). Xt is however 
not intended to analyse the provisions of Section 11(c) in 
this paper (but see Silke, op. cit., paragraph 8.76),
Analogous to the cases dealing with damages or compensation 
payable in respect of delictual liability, is the line of 
cases dealing with amounts which become payable to customers 
or clients as a result of the misappropriation of funds by 
an employee or partner of the taxpayer. (It is pleasant to 
not© that in the reported cases monies are never ''stolen" 
but are only "misappropriated") * The approach adopted in 
these cases is interesting and it is proposed to analyse the 
(Unmlopm&ni: of this approach by dealing with the South
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African decisions in chronological order and thereafter 
comparing the decisions of certain foreign Courts.
The South African decision which started the ball rolling 
was that of Lockie Brothers Limited vs C1R (1922 TPD 42), a 
case in which a manager of the taxpayer embezzled certain 
sums of money belonging to the company. It was held that 
the amount embezzled could not be deducted but the two 
judges who heard the case appeared to differ in their 
reasons. Mason, J. held (at nage 44) that the words "in ths 
production of income" mean connection with the business
is that deductions are to be allowed for any losses or 
outgoings actually incurred in the course of and by reason 
of the ordinary operations undertaken for the purpose of 
conducting the business, not being losses or outgoings of a 
capital nature."
The judge found as a fact that the taxpayer could only 
conduct its operations by means of servants such as the 
manager who has embezzled the funds and that such an 
embezzlement was a risk incidental to all businesses "just 
as the taking of money from the till, the pilfering of 
stock, the negligent handling of goods or the negligent 
conduct of business are well known common sources of loss." 
The learned judge then went i * i n  a passage which has since 
been repeated in many subsequent cases, as follows:
"But there is a distinction between negligent handling 
of goods and embezzlement; the handling of the goods 
is a necessary incident of the business and negligence 
in that respect does not alter the nature of the 
transaction, but embezzlement is quite a different 
thing. It is not an operation undertaken for the 
purposes of the business. This may be illustrated by 
the differences between negligence and crime in its 
relation to the liabilities of the master. If the 
servant by negligent driving on his master's business 
injures a person, the master is liable; if, however, 
the injury was inflicted in an attempted murder, the 
master is not liable; the one is an act performed for 
the purpose of his occupation; the other is not."
On this basis therefore the learned judge found that the 
deduction was not permissible. De Waal, J. on the other 
hand found on the basis that the loss Was a loss of a 
capital nature and for that reason was not deductible. At 
page 48 he said:
“Once the company's assets are converted into money it 
becomes portion of its capital for reinvestment, if so 
desired, in other purchases of rice, and any withdrawal 
of such capital, whether authorised or not, not for the 
purposes and objects of the company, would not be a 
loss or outgoing; and in the case of an illegal or
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criminal abstraction from such funds, the loss to the 
owner of such monies becomes a loss of a capital 
nature."
The deduction in Lockie1s case was therefore disallowed for 
two reasons, it was held by one judge that it was not in the 
production of income and by the other that it was a loss of 
a capital nature.
The next case in this line of cases was ITC 184 (5 SATC 268) 
where a clerk in a firm of accountants embezzled certain 
funds of a client. It was agreed that the firm would be 
responsible for a proportion of the amount stolen and the 
Appellant firm sought to deduct this proportionate share 
from its income in the year of assessment in question. 
Relying on the Lockie Brothers1 case, it was found that the 
deduction was not permissible as the loss was not in the 
production of income. It was said by the Court at page 270 
that "the production of the income and the defalcations of 
the employee have no relationship whatsoever." The amount 
also did not rank as a deduction as a bad debt. The next 
case to fall for decision was ITC 815 (20 SATC 487) where 
the deduction of two separate amounts were sought* The 
first amount related to the loss of certain trust monies 
held by a firm of attorneys which, as a result of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, had been loaned to a party who was 
subsequently convicted of forgery and from whom the amount
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of the loan could not be recovered and was made good by the 
firm. The second amount represented losses arising from the 
embezzlement of funds by employees of the firm.
After remarking that the fact that the compensation was paid 
as a result of negligence Was no bar to its being deductible 
(see the passage already quoted above) the Court went on to 
review various decisions relating to the deductibility of 
damages and compensation. In the course of this it referred 
to an unreported case of the Special Court where a 
stockbroker was permitted to deduct losses of scrip due to 
the negligence of office boys. In dealing with the first 
amount in question, i.e. the funds lost as a result of the 
bad investment, the Court found (at page 493) that "the risk 
of loss in the manner in which this was incurred was a 
necessary incident of the business being carried on by the 
Appellant and his partners. As the income of the 
partnership was earned in part by the investment of money on 
behalf of clients the loss was incurred in the course of an 
operation directly to the production of income, and 
therefore falls within the fundamental rule referred to 
above,"
The loss on the first amount was therefore held to be 
deductible. In dealing with the second amount, the Court 
was bound by the decision in Lockie Brothers and an attempt 
to distinguish the Lockie Brothers1 case on the basis that
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the funds which were embezzled in the present instance were 
trust funds, failed due to lack of evidence in this respect. 
The second amount was therefore held to be not deductible.
Shortly thereafter, the question of the embezzlement of 
trust monies in fact fell for decision, in ITC 894 (23 SATC 
475) the facts were that an employee of a firm of attorneys 
had misappropriated funds held in trust on behalf of 
clients. The amounts stolen were repaid by the partners to 
the clients concerned and the partners sought to deduct 
these amounts from their income. Once again the Court 
relied on the decision in IiOckie Brothers and adopted the 
view that the loss was not incurred in the production of 
income. Furthermore, the Court was of the view that the 
fact that the money embezzled was trust money was immaterial 
(see page 477) . In addition the Court stated that the loss 
was in any event of a capital nature.
In a Rhodesian decision, X vs COT (23 SATC 297, 1960 (2) SA 
682), a firm of attorneys incurred a loss when it instructed 
a certain stockbroker to sell certain stock and the broker 
sold the stock but misappropriated the purchase price, 
whereupon the attorneys' firm had to make good the loss to 
the deceased estate which had owned the stock. It was held 
that the loss had been incurred as a result of negligence On 
the part of the Appellant firm but that the loss had been 
incurred in the course of the firm's business and was
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directed towards the production of the firm's income. 
Furthermore, the fact that the money had been 
misappropriated by a broker employed by the firm did not 
convert the loss into a loss of a capital nature. The 
deduction was accordingly allowed.
In ITC 952 (24 SATC 547) an excellent analysis of the 
position thus far is to be found. In that case a partner in 
a firm of attorneys had misappropriated certain funds which 
the remaining partner was then required to make good. As 
usual, the luckless attorney sought to deduct these amounts 
from his income and after reviewing the various South 
African decisions to date as well as referring to numerous 
decisions of the English, Australian and New Zealand Courts, 
Fieldsend, JX.R. said at page 551;
"In the light of these cases it seems that the 
essential fact to be determined is whether the 
dishonest removal of funds was a reasonably incidental 
risk to the production of assessable income in the 
locality at the time. If it can be said that this was 
the position then it saettis to follow that the loss was 
suffered for the purposes of the trade or in the 
production of the income* This seems to accord with 
the reasoning in such a decision as Curtis vs J & G 
Oldfield Limited (41 TLR 373), where at 374 Rowlatt, J. 
said; 'It was necessary to consider, therefore,
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whether the loss was a loss in trade. It was true that 
if a person, in conducting a business, had to employ 
subordinates, and owing to the negligence or dishonesty 
of an employee some of the receipts did not find their 
way into the accounts, that would be a loss connected 
with or arising out of the trade, and could be 
deducted. But that was not the position in the present 
case. Mr Oldfield was the managing director, and in 
charge of the whole business of the company. There was 
no evidence that the loss was a loss in trade. All 
that was known was that Mr Oldfield made away with 
profits which had been paid over to the company, and 
this he was able to do by virtue of the position he 
held*' This would seem to offer a sound reason for the 
decision in Lockie Brothers1 case, namely that one does 
not reasonably expect a senior manager or managing 
director to make away with his employer's funds, and 
that such a risk is not reasonably incidents 1 to the 
trade, as the petty larcenies o£ servants and the 
leakages through carelessness or dishonesty to which 
the revenues of most profit earning organisations are 
exposed: Ash vs COT (1 AITR at 453).
Applying the law to the facts of the Appellant's case I 
do not think that it can be said that the defalcations 
of a partner in an attorneys' firm can be said to be 
the kind of casualty, mischance or misfortune which is
a natural and recognised incident of the business. If 
a distinction is to be drawn between ordinary servants, 
and managers or managing directors, for which there 
appears to be authority, it seems to me that, a 
fortiori, a partner is in quite a different position to 
an ordinary servant. For this reason alone it seems to 
me that the appeal in this case cannot be allowed."
The deduction was therefore disallowed. This is however the 
first case in the South African Courts in which a 
distinction between the stealing of funds by senior or 
managericil staff or partners has been distinguished as being 
different in nature to the stealing of funds by junior or 
clerical staff.
The latest, and with respect, the best analysis of the 
problem is that of Beadle, C.J. in the Rhodesian case of COT 
vs Rendle (26 SATC 326, 1965 (1) SA 59) » In this case the 
victim of theft was a chartered accountant, whose clerk 
misappropriated certain funds owing to clients of the 
accountant. The amounts in question were repaid to the 
clients and costs of investigating the freud and of seeking 
legal advice were also incurred. The guestion of the 
deductibility of the amounts repaid and of the various 
expenses fell to be decided and the reasoning of Beadle,
C.J. is worth following in some detail. The learned judge 
began his analysis by dividing expenditure into two
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categories, namely "designed expenditure" and "fortuitous 
expenditure". He then said (at page 329):
"The deduction of designed expenditure (so far as the 
law is concerned) presents little difficulty. Provided 
it is designedly and bona fide incurred wholly and 
exclusively for the purpose of trade, it is deductible, 
no matter how rash or unnecessary the expenditure might 
be. It is not for the Commissioner to direct how a 
taxpayer should run his business.
The deduction of fortuitous expenditure, however, 
presents a very difficult legal problem. The decisions 
in the cases are not always consistent, and the 
reasoning of different judges in the same cases are 
often by no means harmonious."
Various cases were then cited and he then stated the 
following as a general test (at page 330) :
"All expenses attached to the performance of a business 
operation bona fide performed for the purpose of 
earning income are deductible whether such expenses are 
necessary for its performance or attached to it by 
chance or are bona fide incurred for the more efficient 
performance of such operations provided they are so 
closely connected with it that it would be proper,
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natural or reasonable to regard the expenses as part of 
the cost of performing the operations, ...
The fortuitous expenditure with which the instant case 
is concerned falls within the second category, that is, 
expenditure attached to the performance of the business 
operation 'by chance'.
In deciding whether such an expenditure is deductible, 
it seems to me the enquiry must be whether the 'chance' 
of such expenditure being incurred is sufficiently 
closely connected with the business operations. The 
enquiry is not whether the actual expenditure itself 
(should it ever eventuate) is sufficiently closely 
connected. If the expenditure itself had to be a 
necessary concomitant of the business before it could 
be deducted, it could hardly be called 'chance 
expenditure'. The word 'chance' is singularly 
inappropriate when describing an event which is bound, 
or almost bound, to happen. If such chance expenditure 
is to be deductible, if it is closely enough connected 
with the business operation, and is still to retain its 
character of 'chance expenditure', it car only be the 
'chance' or the 'risk' of it being incurred which must 
be the link connecting it with that business operation 
... (At page 333) all the cases dealing with this 
subject indicate that before fortuitous expenditure can
be deducted, it must be so closely connected with the 
business operation concerned an to be inseparable from 
it or necessarily incidental tc the carrying on of that 
business. ... In the circumstances, I am satisfied 
that the fortuitous expenditure incurred by the 
Respondents in this case were sufficiently closely 
connected with the Respondent's business operations as 
to be regarded as part of the cost of performing those 
operations."
The argument was also raised that the deduction of funds 
embezzled by the taxpayer's own employees was not 
permissible. In this respect, Beadle, C.J. found that ITC 
184 had been incorrectly decided and that overseas authority 
did not support the proposition. The decision in ITC 815 
could be explained as the Court had been bound by the 
decision in the Lockie Brother’s 1 case and the distinction of 
that case suggested in ITC 952 had not been argued. The 
argument was therefore rejected, as was the argument that 
the loss was of a capital nature as the risk of theft was 
always there, the risk of expenditure was therefore not a 
"once and for all" risk of payment and the expenditure did 
not "bring into existence an asset for the enduring benefit 
of the trade"*
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The deduction was therefore allowed,
The approach adopted in Rendle1s case is reflected in the 
decisions of foreign jurisdictions. In Curtis vs J & G 
Oldfield Limited (94 LJ KB 655) the losses suffered by a 
company due to the defalcations of the managing director was 
found to be not a loss connected with or arising out of the 
trade and therefore not a proper deduction. In the case 
entitled In Re A Taxpayer (3 Australian Tax Decisions 79) - 
a New Zealand decision - the losses suffered by a solicitor 
arising out of the theft of funds by a managing clerk were 
allowed as a deduction. The following test was stated (at 
page 8 0 ) :
"You have not to look at the object for which the money 
was paid - you have to look back to find out where the 
Liability to pay the money first arose, and if the 
source of the liability and the source of the 
production of the income was identical, then the amount 
may be deducted ..."
It would appear that Australian attorneys are often as 
unlucky in their choice of partners as their South African 
counterparts for in the case of Ash vs COT (1 AITR 447) the 
partner of a solicitor stole funds of clients, resulting in 
the remaining partner having to make good the loss. The 
deduction of the loss was disallowed by a High Court 
comprising three judges for three separate reasons. Latham, 
C < Cl. found that the payment was in the nature of an outgoing
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of capital and the loss was a capital loss. Rich, J. found 
(at page 453) that the payment was "the working off of a 
damnosa haereditas of the taxpayer's dead partnership. It 
has no connection with the present practise of his 
profession." Dixon, J. appeared to adopt reasoning similar 
to that of Rich, J. although not identical. The learned 
judge found that the amount paid to the clients was a 
persoiaal liability of the taxpayer secured over certair. t.i 
his capital assets and that its discharge was a matter quitn 
independent of his continuing to practise and quit^ 
Unconnected with the earning of future income (see pagt 
455) *
Solicitors in New Zealand are equally as unlucky as those :.\ 
Australia and South Africa. In COT (NZ) vs Webber (6 AXTi- 
291) a solicitor, who carried on the business of lending out 
monies deposited with him by clients on behalf of his 
clients/ was induced by his bookkeeper to lend money to th< 
bookkeeper which was never repaid. It was found that the 
solicitor had been negligent and that he was responsible: t< 
reimburse his client. The Court distinguished the English, 
Australian and South African decisions on the basis that the 
deduction formula in the New Zealand Statute was mawrially 
different to those in the other countries and then went m. 
to say at page 299:
"Where, therefore, in New Zealand a claim is made in 
respect of a loss, as distinct from an expenditure, it 
seems to me that the enquiry must be simply whether the 
loss was incurred in the course o i  producing the 
assessable income. ... Here I have no difficulty at 
all in deciding that the loss suffered by Respondent 
was one really incidental to the carrying on of his 
practice. A substantial part of the income which he 
derived from that practise admittedly came from 
transactions closely resembling the one in which the 
loss now in question was sustained. It is, I think, 
clearly demonstrated that the loss arose from one of a 
series of transactions, the total of whose resultant 
income constituted a substantial part of Respondent's 
income."
The loss was furthermore found not to be a capital loss and 
the deduction was allowed.
Thus far the canes dealt with have concerned the loss of 
funds due to theft either by an employee of a particular 
concern or by a partner thereof. However, the deductibility 
of amounts stolen by third parties has also been considered. 
In Charles Moore and Co (WA) (Pty) Limited vs Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation (6 AITR 379) a company suffered a 
loss when certain employees who were on their way to bank 
the store's takings were robbed on their way to the bank.
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It was held that the banking of cash takings was a necessary 
part of the operations of the company and that loss by 
robbery was a risk inherent in the procedure adopted in 
banking the takings. Furthermore it was not a loss of a 
capital nature. The deduction was therefore allowed. See 
a^so Goldband Services Limited vs Inland Revenue 
Commissioner (NZ) (8 AITR 193) where a service station was 
robbed of certain cash takings which had not yet been 
banked. It was found that the loss was a reasonably 
incidental risk to the production of assessable income in 
the circumstances and, applying Moore1s case, the deduction 
was allowed.
It would appear in South African law that losses due to 
thefts by third parties or junior staff are deductible. 
However, losses as a result of thefts by partners or senior 
staff are not deductible. It is suggested, with respect, 
that the distinction is untenable and that all such losses 
should be deductible as the possibility of loss by theft is 
an inherent risk in all business. It would appear that the 
distinction was introduced into our law in an attempt to 
distinguish the Lockie Brothers1 case and since then has 
become established as a principle. The other authority 
which is relied on for the proposition, namely Curtis vs 
Oldfield, cannot support the analysis on a close reading of 
the judgment. It would appear that in that case the real 
reason for the decision was that there was no evidence
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before the Court that the loss was of a trading nature. It 
is to be hoped therefore that the unrealistic distinction in 
Our law between losses occasioned by theft by junior and 
Senior staff will disappear in the fullness of time, Not 
only is it an unsatisfactory distinction, but there is no 
clear authority as to exactly where the line is to be drawn 
between junior and senior staff.
Having dealt with cases embodying a criminal element insofar 
as theft is concerned, it would be appropriate to deal 
briefly with the deductibility or otherwise of amounts paid 
by way of fines and penalties, the deductibility of which 
depend upon the same tests as the deductibility of payments 
of compensation or damages. In this respect, two English 
Cases have been decided which have essentially similar 
facts, namely Commissioners of Inland Revenue vs Warnes and 
Company Limited {(1919) 2 KB 444) and CIR vs Alexander von 
Glehn & Company Limited ((1920) 2 KB 553). In both these 
cases the taxpayers were exporters charged with a 
contravention of the Customs (Warpowers) Act of 1915 in that 
they were unable to produce evidence to the satisfaction of 
the Commissioners of Customs and Excise that certain exports 
of theirs had not reached enemy territory. In both cases 
the taxpayers were found guilty of the offence and penalties 
were payable. In neither case was the deduction allowed, 
the reason given in both cases being that the loss was not a 
"commercial loss"* In Von Glehn1s case it was said at page
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briefly with the deductibility or otherwise of amounts paid 
by way of fines and penalties, the deductibility of which 
depend upon the same tests as the deductibility of payments 
of compensation or damages. In this respect, two English 
cases have been decided which have essentially similar 
facts, namely Commissioners of Inland Revenue vs Warnes and 
Company Limited ((1919) 2 KB 444) and CIR vs Alexander von 
Glehn & Company Limited ((1920) 2 KB 553) . In both these 
cases the taxpayers were exporters charged with a 
contravention of the Customs (Warpowers) Act of 1915 in that 
they were unable to produce evidence to the satisfaction of 
the Commissioners of Customs and Excise that certain exports 
of theirs had not reached enemy territory. In both cases 
the taxpayers were found guilty of the offence and penalties 
were payable* In neither case was the deduction allowed, 
the reason given in bo^ h cases being that the loss was not a 
"commercial loss"* In Von Glehn's case it was said at page
569 that "it is not a commercial loss, and I think when the 
Act speaks of a loss connected with or arising out of such 
trade it means a commercial loss connected with or arising 
out of the trade. ... Now it cannot be said that this 
disbursement was made in any way for the purpose of the 
trade or for the purpose of earning the profits of the 
trade."
In South Africa a similar approach has been adopted in 
regard to criminal penalties, and deductions in respect of 
the payment of fines for speeding or parking offences or 
contraventions of price control regulations etc. are as a 
rule disallowed (see, for instance, ITC 1212 (36 SATC 108) 
and ITC 1199 (36 SATC 16)) * This approach would appear to 
be correct and in any event there is, no doubt, an 
unwillingness for policy reasons to permit the deduction of 
fines or penalties imposed by way of criminal sanctions for 
income tax purposes.
In this context however it is interesting to note the 
decision in Smith Vs SIR (30 SATC 35) where the taxpayer was 
an accountant and auditor, and as part of his practice held 
ceftain offices in a company. The company was placed into 
liquidation and the taxpayer and certain other persons were 
charged with fraud and various contraventions of the 
Companies and Insolvency Acts. They were found not guilty 
and discharged. In defending himself against the charges,
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the taxpayer incurred certain expenses which he sought to 
deduct from his income in the year of assessment ended 1961 
in terms of the then equivalent of Section 11(c). It was 
conceded that the expenditure fell within the wording of 
that Section, and the only point for consideration by the 
Appellate Division being whether the expenditure was of a 
capital nature. This was found not to be the case and the 
Court held (Holmes, J.A. dissenting) that the deduction was 
permissible.
A case similar in certain respect? to Smith1s case is ITC 
215 (6 SATC 133) in which case a company had incurred 
certain expenditure in preparing a lease and also in 
defending certain of its employees who had been charged with 
cruelty towards the animals used by the company in the 
course of its business, which was that of cartage 
contractors. Without giving any reasons, the Court found 
that both of these items were "not allowable as current 
expenditure" (pa#6 135) and disallowed their deduction. In 
the light of £>mith1s case it is submitted that the decision 
is not correct.
The next category of decisions to consider is that in which 
a deduction is sought xn respect of damages or compensation 
paid resulting from a breach of contract. The first case to 
be dealt with in this section is ITC 658 (15 SATC 498) . The 
taxpayer in this case was a partner in a firm of building
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contractors. The firm obtained the contract for the 
erection of a block of flats in accordance with certain 
specifications* The contract was completed but sometime 
later it was found that the external walls of the building 
revealed dampness and it was discovered that the walls had 
not been erected according to the specifications. A Claim 
was instituted against the firm of building contractors 
which was settled by the firm making a compromise payment. 
The taxpayer sought to deduct the amount of the damages paid 
and certain legal costs incurred. This deduction was 
disallowed for various reasons. Firstly it was held that 
the expenditure had not been incurred in producing the 
income for the year under review and was accordingly not 
allowable (see page 500). (This is of course not good law 
and it is now accepted that it. is not necessary to match the 
expenditure of one year with the income of the same year - 
see Sub-Nigel Limited vs CIR (supra)), This, fortunately, 
was not the only ground for dismissing the appeal and the 
Court then referred to the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway's 
case and Joffe1s case and found at page 502 that "in the 
present case there is nothing to suggest that negligence in 
observing the details of the plans and specifications, and 
the liability consequent thereon, are the inevitable or 
necessary concomitants of the trading operations of a 
building contractor."
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In ITC 661 (15 SATC 509) a manufacturer failed to deliver 
certain goods in accordance with the terms of a contract and 
was sued for breach of contract. The taxpayer was found to 
be liable for damages and costs,, The Court refused to allow 
the deduction of either the damages or the costs and applied 
the test of the Port Elizabeth Tramway’s case in reaching 
its decision. It held that the expenses did not relate to 
the business operations of the company and were in fact 
quite separate from the business operations. It was stated 
that the expenditure was linked to an act of defending a 
breach of contract and that is not a normal business 
operation (at page 511). This may have been a correct 
statement in the context of this case but phrased as a 
general proposition it is clearly not correct since clearly 
cases in which the defence of a breach of contract action 
may arise where such action is indeed part of the normal 
operations of the company. The argument was also advanced 
by counsel for the Appellant that since the damages would be 
taxable in the hands of the recipient in this ease, they 
should be deductible in the hands of the payer. This 
argument Was rejected by the Court, quite correctly it is 
submitted, since the two issues are completely separate and 
are determined in accordance with completely separate tests. 
It is believed however that the Court approached the case 
from too narrow a viewpoint and that the approach adopted by 
Beadle, C.J. in Rendle1s case is far preferable, i.e* it is 
the risk of a loss being incurred rather than the payment
itself which should be looked to. Accordingly if the 
non-delivery of the goods in this case was due to a strike 
at the manufacturer's plant and there Was a history of 
labour unrest in the particular industry concerned, it ,is 
submitted that the damages paid for non-delivery as a result 
thereof could indeed rank as a deduction. It is not appa­
rent, however, from the reported decision in this case why 
the manufacturer did not deliver the goods as required, 
which is unfortunate as it is believed that this in fact was 
the crux of the case and should have been the proper matter 
for enquiry.
It is however the practice of the Revenue authorities to 
permit a deduction for compensation paid in respect of the 
cancellation of a contract for Lhe sale of goods in the 
ordinary course of business as also for compensation paid 
for the cancellation of a contract for the purchase of goods 
in order to avoid a loss on resale owing to trade conditions 
(see Silke, op, cit,, paragraph 7.27),
ITC 49 (2 SATC 122), the principal business of the 
taxpayer was the sale of petrol lamps, These were sold 
subject to a % arantee and, on a lamp exploding and causing 
injury to a purchaser, an amount was found to be payable in 
terms of the guarantee and in a Court action damages and 
costs were awarded against the taxpayer. It was held by the 
Special Court that the expenditure was incurred in the
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course of the business of the taxpayer, arose out of that 
business and accordingly was deductible.
Damages payable for the repudiation of a contract for the 
hire of a series of films was held to be deductible but the 
costs of defending an action were found not deductible - ITC 
461 (11 SATC 191). The reason for the disallowance of the 
deduction of the legal costs were the remarks made by 
Watermeyer, A.J.P. in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway's 
case where it was held that costs incurred in resisting a 
demand were not deductible. There was however ample 
authority to the contrary (see for instance ITC 49 (supra) 
or ITC 233 (supra) and the Court need not have come to the 
conclusion to which it did in this respect.
A case in which the Court conceded that the taxpayer was 
entitled to the deduction which he sought in principle but 
failed to obtain it in that the necessary facts were not 
established was COT vs Cathcart (27 SATC 1, 1965 (1) SA 
507), Here the taxpayer was an architect who designed a 
particular building. As a condition of his employment, the 
taxpayer was required to give a guarantee that the building 
would be waterproof. The Court found that this guarantee 
had been given in order to secure the work which earned the 
income and that an inherent risk of giving the guarantee was 
that an amount would be payable in terms thereof (see page 
4), Adopting the reasoning of Rendle1s case, the Court
found that in principle amounts payable under the guarantee 
should he deductible? at page S it being said:
"If, therefore, an architect or a building contractor 
gives a guarantee that a building to be designed or 
built by him will be free of certain defects, then it 
seems to me that if those defects do occur in the 
building, then the reasonable cost of remedying them is 
properly deductible.,t
}-, wuver, said the Court, only the costs of remedying the 
uctual defect would be deductible aud any consequential 
losses which the architect may have had to pay were not 
deductible. There was no evidence before the Court as to 
whether the amount was paid in terms of the guarantee and,
If so, what proportion of the amounts so paid represented 
the costs for fulfilling the guarantee and what amount 
represented consequential loss to the owner of the building. 
As the taxpayer had failed to prove that he had paid by 
virtue of his liability in terms of the guarantee he had 
tailed to discharge the onus of proving that the amount was 
property deductible and the appeal by the Commissioner was 
allowed .
in SIR vb John Cull urn Construction Co., (Pty) Limited (1965 
(4) sh 697 A) the taxpayer wished to be released from a 
f itwhci' agreement which it had with another company which it
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considered to be too onerous. The agreement was accordingly 
cancelled, the taxpayer paying an amount in compensation for 
the early termination of the agreement. The taxpayer 
cancelled the agreement in the hope of obtaining finance for 
building schemes on better terms elsewhere but failed to do 
so, Accordingly a new agreement with the same company in 
respect of which it previously had the agreement was eiitered 
into, but on terms more favourable to the taxpayer. As a 
result of the rearrangement of its affairs, the income of 
the taxpayer increased and it sought to deduct from its 
income the compensation paid for the cancellation of the 
first contract. It was agreed that the new arrangement was 
to the advantage of the taxpayer and counsel for the. 
Secretary relied solely on the argument that the expenditure- 
was of a capital nature and for that sole reason not 
deductible? the other requirements for deductibility wort 
conceded. Steyn, C.J. held that the question of whether i 
deduction is of a capital nature or not is a question of 
finding of fact and not of law (see page 70fa) and permitted 
the deduction. The majority judgment delivered by 
Williamson, j.A. found, on considering the various tests 
enunciated by the Courts from time to time as distinguishing; 
capital from revenue, that the expenditure in question war 
not of a capital nature. The deduction was accordingly 
allowed.
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In the course of reaching its decision the Court referred to 
numerous cases including Noble Limited vs Mitchell ( (1926)
43 TLR 102) where a payment to procure the retirement of a 
director whose continued connection with the company was 
considered to be harmful was allowed as a deductible 
expense. An apparently conflicting case of Associated 
Portland Cement Manufacturers Limited vs IRC ( (1946) 1 AER 
6 8) in which payments made to two directors for their 
resignation as such were disallowed was distinguished on the 
basis that in this case the two directors also agreed to a 
restraint of trade which converted the payment into one of a 
capital nature.
Support for the finding of the Court was found in the 
decision of Anqlo-Persian Oil Co Limited vs Dale ((1932) 1 
KB 124), which case also concerned the payment of 
compensation for the early termination of a contract 
regarded as onerous by the taxpayer. The contract in 
question in this case was an agency agreement and after 
cancellation of the contract the taxpayer itself began to 
fulfil the functions previously undertaken by its agent, 
which was found to be to the advantage of the taxpayer. The 
deduction of the amount paid by way of compensation was 
Llowed. At page 732 Lawrence, L.J. said:
"It is not open to doubt that under ordinary
circumstances where a trader, in order to affect a
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saving in his working expenses, dispenses with the 
services of a particular agent or servant, and who 
makes a payment for the cancellation of the agency or 
service agreement, such a payment is properly 
chargeable to revenue; it does not involve any 
addition to or withdrawal from fixed capital; it is 
purely a working expense. The fact that the payment 
includes a sum in consideration of the agent or servant 
agreeing not to compete with his principal or employer 
after the determination of his employment (a 
stipulation frequently met with in these cases) does 
not alter the character of the payment."
The various usual tests applied to distinguish capital from 
revenue were then applied and it was found that no asset of 
an enduring benefit was brought into existence and the 
learned judge concluded at page 734 that:
"The contract to employ an agent to manage the 
taxpayer's business in Persia, however, in no sense 
forms part of the fixed capital of the taxpayer, but is 
a contract relating entirely to the working of the 
taxpayer's business, the method of managing which may 
be changed from time to time. Neither the contract 
itself xior a payment to cancel it would, in my opinion, 
find any place in the capital accounts of the 
taxpayer."
Thus far in this section cases dealing with breach of 
contract in general have been discussed. It is however 
possible to identify certain sub-categories within the field 
of contract as a whole. The first of the sub-categories is 
lease >
•3'n ITC 819 (21 SATC 71) the taxpayer acquired certain 
premises in which it wished to carry on its trade. The 
tenant was however entitled to twelve months' notice to 
vacate the premises in terms of the Rents Act. The taxpayer 
accordingly agreed to pay the tenant an amount of £1 000 by 
way of compensation for the tenant agreeing to vacate the 
premises eight months earlier than he was in fact obliged to 
do* Without giving reasons the Court held that the payment 
was manifestly of a capital nature and was not deductible.
A similar result was obtained in ITC 843 (21 SATC 431) where 
the taxpayer owned a building with a number of separate 
rooms which were let out as residential apartments. In 
order to improve the building's attractiveness to tenants, 
it was desired to install facilities for the provision of 
meals and to this end the taxpayer wished to obtain 
occupation of adjoining premises, also owned by it, which 
contained kitchen and dining room facilities. These 
premises were let to a tenant who, however, agreed to vacate 
the premises in return for payment of certain compensation. 
After this had all been done, the taxpayer let both 
buildings to another company to run as a boarding house.
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But citing the passage from the New State Areas judgment 
which is quoted above in this chapter, the Court found that 
the compensation had been paid for the purpose of "acquiring 
an advantage for the enduring benefit of the trade" (see 
page 432) . The deduction was accordingly not allowed..
Both ITC 819 and ITC 843 were referred to by the Appellate 
Division in Palabora Mining Company Limited Vs SIR (19 73 (3) 
SA 819 A, 35 SATC 159). At page 172 of the SATC report, ITC 
819 was explained on the basis that the taxpayer had pur­
chased an encumbered capital asset and that the sum paid to 
the tenant eliminated the encumbrance and thus formed part 
of the total cost of the capital asset acquired. Similar 
considerations, it was said, applied to ITC 843. Silke (op. 
cit. at page 354) states, in regard to ITC 843, that "it is 
doubtful whether the point was correctly decided".
A conflicting case which it is indeed difficult to reconcile 
with ITC 819 and ITC 843 is ITC 1267 (39 SATC 14 6). The 
taxpayer in this case was a property owning company which 
had leased certain land at a particular rental, some three 
years prior to the expiry of the lease, it came to the 
attention of the taxpayer that the lessee was able to take 
early occupation of other premises which it would otherwise 
only have occupied on termination of the lease. In view of 
the fact that rental for comparable properties had risen
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considerably, the taxpayer negotiated the early termination 
of the lease with the lessee and in return for the lessee 
vacating the premises paid compensation of R25 000. The 
taxpayer then re-let the property at higher rentals which 
resulted, even after taking the compensation paid into 
account, in a net profit to the taxpayer. The question of 
whether the compensation payment was deductible was then 
required to be considered and the Court considered the 
various authorities, including the passage from New State 
Areas case mentioned above. The Court did not consider 
however either ITC 819 or ITC 843. A case relied on in ITC 
843, namely ITC 790 (20 SATC 9 6), was however distinguished.
790 the taxpayer carried on the business of a general 
dealer and also derived income from the letting of property. 
It wished to obtain occupation of property for purposes of 
its own trade and to this end ejected a tenant who Was in 
occupation of the property and in the process incurred 
certain expenses. It was held that these expenses would be 
regarded as capital expenditure as the object of the 
proceedings was to secure a capital asset. The Court, at 
page 150 of the judgment distinguished this case on the 
basis that the property in ITC 790 was required for the 
taxpayer's own business whereas in the present case the 
taxpayer simply wished to re-let the property at a higher 
rental. The Court therefore came to the conclusion that the 
compensation which was paid did not affect the taxpayer's 
income-producing structuret that no new asset or expanded
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field of operations was created and that, in the 
circumstances, there was a direct and close link between the 
expenditure in issue and the taxpayer's income-earning 
operations. The expenditure was therefore deductible.
Despite Silke's reservations concerning the correctness of 
ITC 843, it is noteworthy that the Appellate Division 
expressed no criticism of the decision in referring to is in 
^ e  Palubora case. It is also difficult to support the 
basis upon which ITC 790 was distinguished in ITC 1267, 
since in both cases the building in question constituted a 
capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. It is submitted 
that the correct approach to cases of this nature should be 
to enquire whether the compensation is more closely related 
to the lease (in which case the. payment would be of a 
revenue nature) or to the building which is the subject of 
the lease (in which case it would be of a capital nature) *
On this analysis there would indeed be no conflict between 
the decisions in the various cases mentioned in this 
section, all of which would be correct on the facts of each 
particular case.
A further sub-category which may be dealt with under the 
general heading of contract are payments made in respect of 
restraints of trade. This aspect has, of course, already 
been considered in chapter 2 from the point of view of the 
recipient of a payment in respect of restraint of trade and
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it is now desirable to examine the situation from the point 
of view of the person making the payment and also the 
question of damages resulting from a breach of restraint of 
trade. The first case to be dealt with deals with the 
latter aspect, namely whether the damages paid as a result 
of a breach of restraint of trade are properly deductible or 
not. The case in question is ITC 1310 (42 SATC 177) where, 
in acquiring a one-third share in an accountancy practice, 
the taxpayer had agreed to a restraint of trade which would 
become applicable on the termination of the partnerships 
The partnership terminated and the taxpayer commenced a new 
practice in breach of the restraint of trade clause* An 
action was instituted by the remaining partners and damages 
foi" breach of contract were awarded by an arbitrator. 
Evidence was laid before the Court that the taxpayer had 
taken the risk of being found in breach of the restraint of 
trade clause as it had been necessary for him to earn an 
income and that he had resisted the action brought against 
him in order to protect his income. This evidence was 
accepted by the Court and the deduction of the damages and 
the legal costs was permitted. The argument that the 
payment was of a capital nature was rejected by the Court as 
there was no evidence that the arbitrator had taken the 
goodwill of the taxpayer into account in assessing damages 
and in any event the payment had been made for the purpose 
of earning income*
Page 121.
The second case in this section is Atlantic Refining Company 
of Africa (Pty) Limited vs CIR (1957 (2) SA 330 A). The 
Appellant was a wholesale supplier of petrol and petroleum 
products which had entered into the usual type of agreements 
with proprietors of retail distributing stations in terms of 
which such retailers would distribute only the product 
supplied by the Appellant. It had become common in the 
industry for persons in the position of the Appellant to 
make loans to the retailers with which it had agreements for 
the period of each "tie" agreement. The Appellant had done 
this and several loans had gone bad causing substantial loss 
to the Appellant, which it sought to deduct. The Court 
re-stated the tests already quoted above in the New State 
Areas case and the George Forest Timber case and then sought 
to apply the tests to the case in question. On page 335 the 
Court applied the test to the facts as follows:
"The object Which the Appellant had in view in entering 
into these contracts is obviously of paramount 
importance and is clear. It was designed to acquire 
rights which would ensure the promotion of the sale of 
its commodities, thus extending and improving its 
business with the resultant increase in its income.
The activities of the retailer were consequently 
fettered by a comprehensive set of restraints which 
safe-guarded the interests of the wholesaler almost as 
effectively as if it had operational control of the
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retail business. All possibility of a competing 
supplier obtaining an advantage in the "tied" business 
was excluded and for a defined period an asset was 
acquired, and the value of which depended upon the 
volume of business transacted by the retailer. ...
The money lent was obviously earmarked for use in the 
furtherance of the interest of the retailer's business 
and the successful operation of which enured to the 
mutual benefit of lender and borrower.
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The money devoted to the loan is thus not expended in 
the course of ah ordinary commercial money-lending 
transaction wherein the reward which moves the lender 
is the expectation of the payment of interest. ...
The money so lent forms part of the means employed by 
the retailer, either directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of his business activities and, apart from 
special circumstances or special provisions in the Act 
will constitute an investment of a "capital" nature, 
the loss or deterioration of which will not be a 
permissible deduction.."
The same reasoning would obviously apply a fortiori to the 
actual payments made in restraint of trade themselves which 
would similarly not be deductible.
The above case concludes the category of cases dealing with 
payments made pursuant to a breach or a termination of a 
contract, and it is submitted that the correct test to apply 
in cases of this nature is to ascertain whether the 
contract, in respect of which the payment has been made, is 
sufficiently closely linked with the income-earning 
operations of the Company to permit the payment to qualify 
as a deduction. It is the contract in respect of which the 
payment is made rather than the payment itself which must be 
looked to.
The next category to be dealt with are cases dealing with 
expenditure incurred when protecting the business of a 
taxpayer. Although, strictly speaking, these cases do not 
deal with the question of damages or compensation, the 
principles applied in these cases are of application in the 
field of damages and compensation and the cases to be quoted 
have been relied on heavily in reaching decisions in the 
field of compensation and damages* The only South African 
decision in this category is African Greyhound Racing 
Association (Pty) Limited vs CIR (1945 TPD 34.4) where the 
taxpayer sought to deduct legal expenses which it had 
incurred in making representations before a Commission 
enquiring into the question whether dog racing should be 
abolished or its activities curtailed. The Transvaal 
Provincial Division cited the cases o£ Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway and Joffe and in reaching its decision
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relied upon the English oase of Ward and Company vs COT 
(3923 AC 145, 399 TLR 90) where, it was said in dealing with
■ • similar case that.:
"Wit: tind it. quite impossible to hold that the 
expenditure was incurred exclusively, or at all, in the 
production of the assessable income* It was incurred 
not for the production of income, but for the purpose 
)i: preventing the extinction of the business from which 
the income was derived, which is quite a different 
thing,"
iroi the same reasons the expenditure in this case was 
disallowed by the Court,
Ward 1 a case was a New Zealand case which went on appeal to 
the Privy Council and dealt with the question of whether 
expenditure incurred in printing and distributing 
anti-prohibition literature by a brewery company was 
deductible*
A referendum was to be held on whether or not prohibition of 
liquor should be introduced in New Zealand and the brewery 
company conducted a campaign in opposition to this. For the 
reasons given in the quote above, the deduction was 
disallowed* The Court went on to say at page 14 9:
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"The expenditure in question was nut necessary for the 
production of profit, nor was it in fact incurred for 
that purpose. It Was a voluntary expense incurred with 
a view to influencing public opinion against taking a 
step which would have depreciated and partly destroyed 
the profit-bearing thing. The expenses may have been 
wisely undertaken, and may properly find a place, 
either in the balance sheet or in the profit and loss 
account of the Appellants? but this is not enough to 
take it out of the prohibition in Section 8 6, 
sub-section 1(a) of the Act. For that purpose it must 
have been incurred for the direct purpose of producing 
profits . 11
A similar decision was taken in Morgan (The Inspector o£ 
Taxes) vs Tate and Lyle Limited (supra) , a case which dealt, 
with expenditure undertaken by a sugar refining company on 
an anti-nationalisation campaign which included advertising, 
film making, film showing, the issue of pamphlets, rationing 
books, bookholders, photographs and recordings.
Interestingly enough, however, in this case the Law Lords 
reached the conclusion that the money was "wholly and 
exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of the 
trade" and was deductible (two Lords dissenting). It was 
accepted by the Court that the purpose of the expenditure 
was to prevent the seizure of the "business and assets '1 of 
the company (see page 416). It was recognised that
nationalisation could have taken place, not by the seizure 
of the assets of the industry, but by expropriating the 
shares in the existing company which clearly would have 
raised other considerations. Although this was a 
possibility, the Court appeared to have accepted that the 
company had not seriously considered this possibility and 
that its campaign had been directed to the preservation of 
the assets of the company. Furthermore, counsel for the 
Crown had not relied on a capital argument but solely on the 
prohibition in rule 3(a) which provided that money has to be 
laid out wholly and exclusively for purposes of trade to be 
deductible. The Court accordingly was not asked to consider 
a capital argument and was concerned solely with the 
interpretation of the rule in question. The decision in 
Ward *s case was in any event distinguished on the basis that 
the language of the New Zealand statute was different to 
that under the English Act* An argument was advanced that 
the trade was something completely separate from the 
company's business and that the nationalisation of the trade 
would not affect the trade itself since it would remain 
intact and would continue with the same assets and machinery 
as before. This argument was rejected by the majority 
judges who found that the rule meant "the trade of the 
company" and not a trade as an isolated entity. An argument 
along these lines however appeared to find favour with the 
dissenting minority judges, but it is submitted and an 
analysis of the minority judgment makes it clear that,
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although the question of capital vs revenue was not raised, 
the minority judges in effect found that the expenditure was 
of a capital nature. The minority judges also approved the 
decision in Ward1s case and felt it was of application to 
the present case (see pages 434 and 438 of the judgment),
It is not clear from the reported judgment why the argument 
on capital was not pursued by the Crown as that argument had 
succeeded in both Ward1s case and the African Greyhound 
Racing Association case and, as appears from the minority 
judgments, found some favour with at least two of the judges 
in the House of Lords * On the arguments presented however, 
the decision is undoubtedly correct.
An interesting side-light emerges from the judgment of Lord 
Reed relating to whether the reasoning underlying the 
purpose for expenditure has any bearing on the question.
His Lordship said at pages 424 - 425 i
"People often have more than one reason for forming a 
purpose, and I think that the facts found in the case 
indicate that the directors had two main reasons. They 
believed that nationalisation would be disastrous to 
the industry and that it would cause loss to the 
shareholders. Whether their beliefs were right or 
wrong is quite immaterial* The question whether their 
purpose can be held to come within the terms of rule 
3 (a) does not depend on whether or not their purpose
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was misconceived. The shareholders purpose and reasons 
are set out in the resolution of September 15 and there 
is nothing in the case to indicate that its terms do 
not reflect their real purpose and reasons. Their 
purpose was to prevent the assets of the company being 
seized and the reasons were that such seizure would 
harm the workers, consumers and themselves alike.
Again, it does not matter Whether those reasons were 
good or bad."
The question of whether the test of purpose in these 
circumstances is subjective or objective does not yet appear 
to have enjoyed the attention of the Courts in South Africa 
but it is -submitted that the reasoning of Lord Reed has much 
to recommend it and would be in line with the attitude 
already evinced by the South African Courts that it is not 
for the Courts to prescribe whether a business is to be run 
efficiently or otherwise or to penalise by increased tax the 
inefficient running of a business. (See the Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway1s case at page 244) .
A further category which should be dealt with in this 
chapter are payments made to protect "the good name" of a 
taxpayer. In ITC 1002 (25 SATC 231) , the facts were that 
the taxpayer was an accountant who administered the affairs 
of his clients including those of a particular widow. He 
recommended to the widow that she invest in certain
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companies which he had established which she then did. The 
company did not prosper and doubts were expressed by the 
widow to the taxpayer as to the administration of her funds 
by him. The dispute between the taxpayer and the widow was 
settled by the taxpayer agreeing to purchase from the widow 
certain shares in the one company which the widow had 
purchased together with a payment of a sum in respect of 
interest and to repay to the widow her investment in the 
other company. The deduction of the amount in respect of 
the purchase of shares was disallowed because the 
transaction took the form of the purchase of shares by the 
taxpayer and the Court was not prepared to go behind the 
ostensible form of the transaction. (Presumably the Court 
regarded this acquisition as an acquisition of a capital 
nature but this is not clear from the judgment). in regard 
to the amount payable as a refund of the one investment 
which had gone bad, the Court permitted the deduction of 
this amount. The Court found that there was no evidence 
indicating that the taxpayer had been negligent in his 
handling Of the affairs and although he may have had a moral 
obligation to relieve the widow of her investment, it could 
not be said that he was legally obliged to do So. The Court 
went on tc say at page 234:
"On principle it seems to me that expenditure to
protect the good name of a trader or a professional man
in his trade or profession can be a legitimate 
deduction. ...
Consequently, on the facts as I find them, it seems to 
me that there is a sufficiently close link between 
expenditure incurred in settling a claim arising out of 
allegations of misconduct in the matter of the 
administration of the widow's affairs, and the carrying 
on of the Appellant's business to hold that such 
expenditure would be expenditure wholly and exclusively 
incurred by the taxpayer for the purposes of his trade. 
It was clearly in the interests of the Appellant in his 
business as an accountant to settle a matter of this 
sort without publicity, and the matter he was settling 
Was a matter connected with - indeed, part and parcel 
of - his trade.
On the authorities I have already referred to and on 
the case of Morgan vs Tate and Lyle Limited .,,, I do 
not think that such expenditure can properly be said to 
be capital expenditure."
One of the cases relied on in ITC 1002 was the English case 
of Golder (Inspector of Taxes) vs Great Boulder (proprie­
tary) Gold Mines Limited ((1952) 1 AER 360) . The taxpayer 
in this company faced actions for fraud in relation to 
prospectuses issued by companies in which the taxpayer had
Page 131.
been involved in its business of company promotion. The 
taxpayer did not admit the allegations which had been made 
but in order to avoid the risk of an action as well as the 
heavy costs which would be involved, agreed to settle the 
various actions and made payments amounting to some £25 000 
as well as incurring legal costs Of some £2 500. The 
allegations of fraud or negligence were never proved and the 
Court came to the following conclusion at page 363;
"A trade of company promotion was carried on and 
profits earned by the sale of assets to the company 
Which had been promoted. There was no evidence 
establishing that such a trade had been abandoned. 
Arising out of that trade a claim for damages was made 
against the company which would seriously affect its 
reputation as a company promoter if the claim 
succeeded. The company settled with its adversaries 
fot reasons thus described by a director of the 
company:
'in seeking a settlement, the board had had in 
mind the very large and seirious liability in costs 
with which the company would be faced, even if it 
won the actions, and in costs plus damages, if it 
lost. Those had been the main considerations. It 
was a question of saving money, and they had
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thought it cheaper to settle for £25 000 than to 
run a risk.•
With that evidence before them the Commissioners held 
that the £25 000 and the attendant costs were 
disbursements made wholly and exclusively for the 
purposes of the trade. I cannot say they were bound in 
law to hold the other way, and I, therefore, am unable 
to sustain the Crown's appeal."
Prom the passage quoted above it is not clear to what extent 
the protection of the good name of the company concerned 
weighed with the Court but it would certainly appear to have 
been a factor taken into consideration by the Court in 
reaching its conclusion.
A final case to deal with in this chapter is C1R Vs 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery (1945 CPD 377) . This case does 
not fit happily into any of the general categories discussed 
in this chapter but does have certain points in common with 
the previous two cases discussed. In this case the SFW had 
successfully opposed an application by a competing firm to 
register a trade mark of a sherry which the SFW had 
successfully marketed. It was found that the validity of 
SFW's own labels was not in issue and that its application 
was based on nullifying the competition of a rival. It was 
clearly established that the successful opposition of the
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trade mark application had a beneficial effect on the 
business of SFW as sales in the particular product concerned 
increased after SFW's successful action. As the Court said 
at page 388:
"Its main purpose, therefore, in expending this money 
was not to protect its design but to oust the rival 
competition and so maintain and increase its profits, 
and in carrying out this objective it incurred the 
legal costs it now seeks to deduct.''
At page 385 the remarks of Watermeyer, A.J.P* in the Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramway's case relating to legal costs 
was criticised, the Court stating:
"May I say, with the greatest respect to the learned 
judges who decided that case, that I incline to the 
opinion that on the question whether these legal costs 
were art allowable deduction too narrow a view was taken 
of the matter and that in the light of the authorities 
that have been cited to us in this case, I think they 
should have been allowed as a deduction. They were, in 
my opinion, directly connected with the earning of the 
income. If the defence to the claim for compensation 
had succeeded, the income of the company would pro 
tanto have been increased. Legal expenditure may be 
necessarily incurred to prevent a loss of income, and
so be directly connected with the earning of the 
.income. It cannot make any difference in principle 
whether the litigation succeeds or not."
The Court also found support for its view that the deduction 
should be allowed in the case of Southern Borax Consolidated 
Limited ((1940) 4 AER 412), an English case in which the 
taxpayer incurred legal costs in defending title to certain 
property. It was held in that case that the expense had 
been incurredr not in creating any new asset, but in 
maintaining the title to the company's property and was 
therefore an expense wholly and exclusively incurred for the 
purposes of the company's trade and, as such, was properly 
deductible. (See page 3 88 of the report). The Court went 
on to find that the expenditure was not of a capital nature 
and was properly deductible.
This question would today be dealt with in terms of Section 
11(c) of the Act and would, it is clear, be deductible in 
terms of that Section as well.
In conclusion therefore, it may be said that the tests 
applied in determining the deductibility of payments made by 
way of damages or compensation are substantially the same 
whatever the underlying reason for the payment might be, 
whether it be made by way of expunging a delictual liability 
or by reason of a breach of contract* applying the test,
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however, the distinction between the various categories, it 
is submitted, becomes of relevance. In dealing with 
payments of a delictual nature, the test as laid out in the 
Rendle1s case is the proper test for application, namely it 
is the risk of the event which has given rise to the payment 
happening which is of relevance, and the link between that 
risk occurring and the business of the taxpayer is the vital 
connection. The closer the link, the more likely the 
payment will rank as a deduction. In contractual Cases on 
the other hand, it is the relation between the contract in 
respect of which the payment is being made and the business 
of the taxpayer which is of relevance. It is the place of 
the contract in the overall structure of the company's 
operations which is vital and the closeness of that contract 
to the income-earning operations of the company and its 
trade as a Whole which has to be determined in deciding 
whether a deduction under Sections 11(a) and 23(g) of the 
Income Tax Act is allowable. It is submitted that all 
losses resulting from the theft of monies should be 
deductible and the distinction based on whether the monies 
in question were stolen by clerical or managerial staff is 
unrealistic and should be done away with. It is furthermore 
apparent that payments made in defending the assets of a 
business will generally be deductible except insofar as the 
payment is made to protect the entire capital structure of 
the business in which case it would be a payment of a 
capital nature.
Before concluding this chapter, brief mention should be made 
of Section 23(c) of the Income Tax Act which provides that 
no deductions shall be made in respect of "any loss or 
expense, the deduction of which would otherwise be 
allowable, to the extent to which it is recoverable under 
any contract of insurance/ guarantee, security or 
indemnity." Accordingly even though a payment made by way 
of damages or compensation may, on the various tests 
enumerated above, rank as a deduction, to the extent that it 
is recoverable from any insurance or other such policy as 
mentioned in Section 23(c), it will not be deductible.
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Chapter 4 - The relevance o£ the incidence, of tax xr. 
determining the quantum of damages
The leading case in determining whether, in assessing the- 
amount of damages to be awarded in a civil action, the 
incidence of tax should be considered, is British Transport 
Commission vs Gourley ((1955) 3 AER 796). The facts of thit 
well known case are that a senior partner in a firm or civii 
engineers was seriously injured in a railway accident. 
Although not completely incapacitated, the Respondent's 
earnings were reduced and damages were awarded to the 
Respondent. The trial judge settled two alternative amounts 
of damages, one amount being the figure to be awarded if tax 
was not to be taken into account and the other figure to . 
awarded if tax was to be taken into account. The trial 
judge awarded the former figure. The matter for decision ’• 
the House of Lords was simply whether an amount in respect 
of tax, which would have been payable if the Respondent had 
himself earned the amount represented by the damages, should 
be deducted from the damages to be awarded to him.
Xn Gourley1s case it was agreed by the counsel on both sides 
that the award of damages would not be subject to tax itself 
(see page 7 99) * At the same reference, the Court stated the
general principle applicable to the assessment of damages as 
follows:
"The broad general principle which would govern the 
assessment of damages in cases such as this is that the 
tribunal should award the injured party such a sum of 
money as will put him in the same position as he would 
have been in if he had not sustained the injuries. ... 
The principle is sometimes referred to as the principle 
of restitutio in integrum; but it is manifest that no 
award of money can possibly compensate a man for such 
grievous injuries as the Respondent in this case has 
suffered ... the principle can however, afford some 
guidance to the tribunal in assessing compensation for 
the financial loss resulting from an accident, and in 
such cases it had been referred to as 'the dominant 
rule of law1."
The Court then went on to review the meagre authority on the 
issue to date, it was found that the following cases had 
held that damages should not be reduced to provide for a 
notional deduction of income tax: Fairholme Vs Firth and 
Brown Limited {(1933) (149 LT 332)); Jordan vs Limmer and 
Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co Limited ((1946) 1 AER 527); Davies 
V s Adelaide Chemical and Fertiliser Co Limited (2) ((1947) 
SASR 67); Blackwood vs Andre (1947 SC 333) ; Biilingham vs 
Hughes ((1949) 1 AER 684); and W. Wrought Limited vs West
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Suffolk County Council ((1955) 2 AER 337). The reason 
advanced in these cases for maintaining that it was not 
proper to make a deduction in respect of tax which would 
have been payable if the damages had been earned, was that 
the question for liability for tax was res inter alios acta, 
in other words it had absolutely nothing to do with the 
assessment of damages and was a separate matter between the 
State and the person concerned. Allied to this was the 
feeling that to permit a deduction in assessing damages for 
a notional tax liability would be to unduly benefit the 
wrongdoer in that there would be no benefit to the State in 
permitting the deduction whereas the wrongdoer would benefit 
in that he would have to pay a smaller amount in damages. 
Against the line of cases holding that tax was irrelevant in 
assessing damages, was the solitary decision of M'Daid vs 
Clyde Navigation Trustees (1946 SC 462) where Lord Sorn had 
held that to ignore the tax position at the present day 
would be to act in a manner which was out of touch with 
reality. The case of Comyn vs AG ((1950) IR 142) which was 
cited to the Court/ although not altogether in point, also 
seemed to support this.
Going against tlv weight of authority, the Court found that 
it was proper to take the incidence of tax into account in 
assessing the amount of damages to be awarded. It stated at 
page 800 that "in all such cases the real issue seems to be 
whether the facts relied on as affecting the measure of
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damages are too remote to be taken into consideration." At 
page 802 it dealt with the various arguments raised against 
taking tax into account as follows:
"My Lords, it is, 1 think, if X may say so with the 
utmost respect, fallacious to consider the problem as 
though a benefit were being conferred on a wrongdoer by 
allowing him to abate the damages for which he would 
otherwise be liable. The problem is rather for what 
damages is he liable; and, if we apply the dominant 
rule, we should answer 'he is liable for such damages 
as, by reason of his wrongdoing, the Plaintiff has 
sustained'. X cannot think that the risk of confusion 
arising if the tax position be taken into consideration 
should make us hesitate to apply the rule of law if we 
can ascertain what t*iat rule is. Nor should we be 
detered from applying that rule by the consistent or 
inveterate practice of the Courts in not taking the tax 
position into consideration in those cases in which the 
Courts were never invited to do so*
My Lords, X agree with Lord Sorn in thinking that to 
ignore the tax element at the present day would be to 
act in a manner which is out of touch with reality*
Nor can I regard the tax element as so remote that it 
should be disregarded in assessing damages. The 
obligation to pay tax - save for those in possession of
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exiguous incomes - is almost universal in its 
application. That obligation is ever present in the 
minds of those who are called on to pay taxes, and no 
sensible person any longer regards the net earnings 
from his trade or profession as the equivalent of his 
available income. Indeed, save for the fact that in 
many cases - though by no means in all cases - tax only 
becomes payable after the money has been received, 
there is, I think, no element of remoteness or 
uncertainty about its incidence."
It was found therefore that the damages awarded should be 
those calculated after taking into account the tax which 
would otherwise have been payable. Lord Keith of Avonholm 
however dissented stating, at page 811, that "it is a 
strange turn of fortune's wheel that the intricacies and 
accidents of fiscal legislation should have its 
repercussions in the assessment of damages in the Civil 
Courts". A major objection raised by Lord Keith was the 
difficulty of assessing to what extent a deduction in 
respect of tax should be allowed. This difficulty was 
recognised by the majority judges and at page 805 Lord 
Goddard attempted to deal with the problem as follows:
"We were not informed what the calculations were Which 
had resulted in this figure. But, in considering 
special damages in these cases, related tax to be taken
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must, as it seems to me, be the effective rate of 
income tax and, if necessary, surtax, which would have 
been applicable to the sums in question if they had 
been earned. That rate depends on the combination of a 
number of factors that may vary with each case - 
allowances, reduced rates, surtax rates, other income 
of the claimant or his wife, charges or reliefs. The 
task of determining it may not always be an easy one, 
but, in complicated cases, it is to be hoped that the 
parties, with the help of accountants, will be able to 
agree figures. If not, the Court must do its best to 
arrive at a reasonable figure, even though it cannot be 
said to be an exact one."
Gourley's case has since been followed in the English Courts 
and still constitutes good law, as may be seen from the 
following cases. West Suffolk County Council vs W, Wrought 
Limited ((1956) 3 AER 216), a casfe in which business 
premises were expropriated. There was a delay before the 
Respondents were able to take occupation of new premises and 
they were paid compensation for the ioss of profits which 
they had suffered in the interim period due to the 
interruption of their business. It was held by the House of 
Lords, following their decision in Gourley's Case, that the 
tax which would have been payable had the profits been 
earned in the ordinary course of business, had to be taken 
into account in assessing the damages to be awarded.
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Similarly In Re Houghton Main Colliery Co Limited ((1956) 3 
AER 300) it was held that the incidence of tax on lump sum 
compensations paid in lieu of pensions to former employees 
of a company placed into voluntary liquidation should be 
determined after taking into account the tax which would 
otherwise have been payable on the pensions themselves.
It is clear from these cases as also from the remarks in 
Beach vs Reed Corrugated Cases Limited ((1956) 2 AER 652 at 
659 B) that there is no difference in principle in assessing 
the damages to be awarded in cases of personal injury based 
in delict and in actions for wrongful dismissal founded on 
breach of contract.
It cannot be said that the rule has as yet found acceptance 
in South African law and the position can only be described 
as open at present. In Pitt vs Economic Insurance Co 
Limited (1957 (3) SA 284) a decision of the Durban and Coast 
Local Division, in determining the damages to be awarded 
arising out of a motor collision, Holmes, J* had the 
following to say:
"It seems to me that in a case of this kind the object 
of awarding compensation for loss of income is to put 
the Plaintiff financially in a position in which he 
would have been but for his injuries. If the Court, in 
making the award, takes no account of evidence relating
to income tax, the Plaintiff might, in the result, be 
better off than he would have been if he had not been 
injured - and at the Defendant's expense. I would add, 
as a matter of interest, that this is now the accepted 
view in England ... Of course, owing to the 
uncertainties of the future it is not possible to make 
any precise calculation in this respect, anymore than 
it is possible to give mathematical expression to a 
widow's prospects of remarriage in compensating her for 
the loss of her breadwinner - Cupid being notoriously 
incorrigible and unpredictable. But this difficulty of 
assessment is no reason for not taking such factors 
into account. A Court's task in estimating damages is 
always a difficult one. Basically, one has evidence as 
to all the Plaintiff's affairs, but when? in addition, 
the future has to be scanned the Court is virtually 
called upon to ponder the imponderable. However, no 
better system for assessing damages has yet been 
evolved, and the Court has to do the best it can with 
the material available, even if, in the result, its 
award might be described as an informed guess. I have 
only to add that the Court must take care to see that 
its award is fair to both sides - it must give just 
compensation to the Plaintiff, but must not pour out 
largesse from the horn of plenty at the Defendant's
expense."
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The Appellate Division however, has not yet adopted the rule 
and indeed, on two occasions, has refrained from doing so. 
The first of these was in the case of Ti-hitfield vs Phillips 
(1957 (3) S7\ 318 A) , a case dealing with damages for loss of 
crops following on the repudiation of a contract for the 
sale of a farm. At pages 345 - 346 of the judgment, Steyh, 
j.A. expressed some doubt "as to the soundness in our law of 
the conclusion reached in Gourley1s case and of the 
feasibility of adopting a similar procedure in the 
assessment of damaqes" but did not find it necessary to 
finally decide the issue. The judge went on to Say:
"The first proposition, i.e. that the amount awarded 
will be regarded as a capital accrual, is basic to the 
whole contention advanced on behalf of the Defendant. 
Unless it is established, there is no room for the 
conclusion that with a deduction by way of income tax 
the Plaintiffs would be in a better position than they 
would have been in had the contract been performed. 
Until it is established, the tax which the Plaintiffs 
would have had to pay on the profit from the crop which 
they have lost, would be irrelevant, and there would be 
no cause or foundation for requiring the Plaintiffs to 
show what the amount of tax (if any) would have been.
The Defendant did not mention the matter in his 
pleadings and did not raise it at all before the Trial 
Court. On the facts before the Court, moreover, X
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■would not be prepared to hold that there Is a 
probability that the award Will be regarded by the 
competent authorities as a capital accrual tc> the 
Plaintiffs. ... that will be a matter for the 
Commissioner and. for the Special Court, if there is an 
aPPeal, but on the assumption that the facts before 
this Court will be the facts before the Commissioner, 
I'm unable to say that that view will probably not 
prevail."
Thus although certain doubts were expressed as to the 
validity of the ruling in Gourley1s case, it dan be seen 
that the real reason in this case for the Appellate Division 
refusing to apply the rule was that they were unconvinced 
that the damages which they would award would not be subject 
to tax,
(For a discussion of the Pitt1s case and the Whitfield1s 
case see 1957 Taxpayer 266 and 1957 SAiJ 367). in the 
latter article, Professor McKerron expresses some doubt as 
td the reasons advanced by Steyn, J.A, regarding the 
feasibility of applying the rule in Gourley1s case insofar 
as tax is a question for decision by the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue. Professor McKerron points out that the 
incidence of tax is a question of law upon which any 
competent Court of law is able to decide. He goes on to say 
however that the intricacies of determining an appropriate
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deduction for tax are so fraught with difficulty that the 
rule should not be applied. He states at page 368:
"Considerations of logic and elegantia juris must 
sometimes give way to considerations of expediency and 
convenience. In the opinion of the writer this is a 
matter in which the latter should prevail, and it is to 
be hoped that this is the view which our Courts will 
ultimately adopt."
In his book, The Law of Delict, page 119, Professor McKerron 
repeats that in law the rule in Gourley1s case is correct 
but reiterates his reservations as to its practicability.
Gillbanks vs sigournay (1959 (2) SA 11) the Natal 
Provincial Division in determining damages for loss of 
future earnings arising out of a motor accident held that in 
principle the basis of assessment laid down in Gourley's 
case was correct but felt that the uncertainties of the 
future make any precise calculation in respect of income tax 
well nigh impossible, (page 19). However the Court did 
Attempt to take tax into account in assessing damages. The 
case however went on appeal before the Appellate Division 
(SicTOurnav vs Gillbanks - 1960 (2) SA 552 A) where the Court 
found that as material for making any adjustment on account 
of income tax was very slender in this case and if such an 
adjustment was made it might well be widely wrong, the Court
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in the circumstances did. not take the tax factor into 
account. It can be seen however that again the rule was not 
applied for practical reasons rather than as a result of 
objections in principle. (See also 1959 Taxpayer 94).
Before concluding this chapter, it is desirable to examine 
two of the more recent English decisions on the application 
Gourley's rule to see to what extent the doctrine has 
developed in English Law. In Parsons vs BNM Laboratories 
Li ..ited ((1964) 1 QB 95) it was held that where an award of 
damages is subject to tax in the Plaintiff's hands then the 
effective tax must be ignored on both sides when assessing 
the quantum of damages. On the other hand in Shove vs Downfc 
Surgical Pic ((1984) 1 AER 7) the Court said the following 
at page 9:
"In Gourley's case the damages awarded were not subject 
to diminution by taxation in the hands of the 
Plaintiff. In the instant case the dimiges to which 
the Plaintiff is entitled will be taxable in his hard?;. 
They will be taxable whether or not I accept all the 
submissions made on behalf of the Defendants. This haa 
given rise to much debate as to the correct principle 
to be applied. On one view of such a case it is said 
that, because the income of which the Plaintiff has 
been deprived and the damages which he will receive are 
both taxable, the Court should ignore taxation
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altogether. At the other extreme it was argued that 
the correct principle is to start by estimating the net 
amount which would have been received by the Plaintiff 
after the deduction of tax from his gross income. That 
net amount would represent as realistically as possible 
his actual loss. Thereafter, in assessing the damages, 
the Court should take into account the Plaintiff's 
liability to tax on the damages awarded so that the net 
amount received should, so far as possible, equal the 
net or actual loss suffered."
In making its decision, the Court felt that tax should be 
considered in making the award and accordingly awarded a 
gross sum so that, after deduction of the tax which would 
become payable, the net amount left would be the actual 
amount which the Court considered represented the 
Plaintiff's net loss. It can be seen that the rule in 
Gourley1s case has been accepted into English law and that 
the refining of that rule is well advanced. In South 
African law on the o+“ nr hand, it would appear that our 
Courts are reluctant to apply the rule not for reasons of 
principle, since it would appear to be admitted that the 
rule is probably correct in law, but for practical reasons 
in that it is felt that the determination of the possible 
incidence of tax is so difficult that a meaningful deduction 
cannot be made. It can only be a matter of time however
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before the Appellate Division is compelled to utter on this ;
I'
point. 1
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion
The tax treatment of damages and compensation has been 
examined from three angles in this paper, whether the 
receipt or accrual of an amount by way of compensation or 
damages is taxable, whether the payment of such an amount is 
deductible and whether the incidence of tax should be 
considered in determining an award of damages. Certainly in 
regard to the first two queries one may quote the words of 
Malan, J\A. in Atlantic Refining Company of Africa (Pty) 
Limited (supra) at page 334:
"It would appear that the final word has probably been 
spoken upon the expoundment of the law which has been 
stated in very clear and precise language. The 
difficulty lies in its application to the facts of 
particular cases."
Although the law on this topic may not have been expounded 
with quite the clarity and precision referred to by the 
learned judge (who was in fact referring to the test for 
capital and revenue) it is clear that the basic tests 
applicable in each case are firmly established. These tests 
may not always have been expressed in the clearest terms or 
with complete consistency but nevertheless, it must be 
conceded, a fa:.r degree of certainty exists in this regard.
The difficulty, as Malan, J.A. suggests, is not so much in 
framing a test as in applying it to the facts of the 
particular cases.
The question of the relevance of tax, in assessing the 
amount of damages to be awarded, as has been seen, is a 
question as yet unresolved in South African Law and one 
fraught with difficulties in application. These difficul­
ties are even more apparent today than in the past, as today 
there is no certainty as to the rate of tax from year to 
year and indeed the whole basis of tax may be regarded as 
altering with the introduction of greater indirect taxes and 
the probable introduction of fringe benefits tax. It can be 
seen therefore that in attempting to make a notional deduc­
tion for a tax liability in computing damages, the Courts 
would indeed be doing little more than guessing and any 
figure so arrived at can only be described as arbitrary to a 
very large extent.
The tax treatment of damages and compensation, as illustra­
ted by the numerous cases cited in the preceding pages, is a 
topic which has attracted considerable attention by the 
Courts, and has resulted in the formulation of a number of 
tests. Although therefore, in theory, the correct approach 
to the various problems posed would appear to have been 
extensively analysed, the continued appearance of cases of 
this nature indicates that the difficulties of the correct
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application of the tests and the endless variations of facts 
which occur, render problems of this nature far from easy to 
resolve.
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